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Abstract
A Threat-Rigidity Analysis of the Apache Software Foundation's Response
to Reported Server Security Issues
By
Yoav Shapira
Submitted to the System Design and Management Program in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Engineering and Management
There exists a broad body of literature documenting organizational responses to
competitive threats, including those responses which fit into the threat-rigidity
hypothesis. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how a novel organizational form,
the open-source software development community known as the Apache Software
Foundation, responds to a specific type of threat: security issues reported to exist in its
software products.
An analysis of publicly available data from the Apache Software Foundation is
conducted, the security issue handling process is described in detail, and an analysis on
security issue origin, severity, and resolution is provided. Special attention is given to
communication along the issue resolution process, as the threat-rigidity hypothesis
predicts a reduction in the flow of information across the organization. The results show
that this organization defies some central predictions of the hypothesis: there is little
reduction in information flow, little or no centralization in decision-making, and no loss
of group-level focus.
The research results are framed within the literature of user-led innovation and
organizational behavior. The implications for traditional software development
organizations are discussed, and recommendations for further research are provided.
Thesis Supervisor:
Eric A. von Hippel, Professor of Management
Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1: Introduction
"Software is usually accompanied by documentation in the form of big fat scary manuals
that nobody ever reads. In fact, for the past five years most of the manuals shipped with
software products have actually been copies of Stephen King's The Stand with new
covers pasted on.
-Dave Barry
For better or worse, competition is the primary focus for most companies and managers
in the world. It is an existing fact in most markets, and a weight for consideration in
nearly all product development processes. After all, if one company's product is inferior
to a competitor's offering, that company will most likely sell fewer units, make less
money, and deliver less value to its shareholders. That, at least, is the prevailing thought
in many organizations, and numerous strategies have been formulated and studied in
order to defeat the competition in one manner or another.
Researchers in the academic fields of psychology, organizational behavior, strategy, and
management have been conducting studies of competition for centuries. A broad and rich
body of literature exists on the topic, and specific parts of it are reviewed later in this
thesis. Within this body of work is a segment focusing on organizational responses to
competitive threats: how do companies behave when a competitor's product is shown to
be superior, or when a newcomer threatens to corner a lucrative market segment? How
do individuals or groups scramble to address the threat? What is the role of managers in
redirecting strategy - do they just add stress? These questions and more are of interest to
researchers in the combined areas of organizational behavior, psychology, and
technology management.
One hypothesis in this area is that of threat-rigidity. Originally posed by Staw,
Sandelands, and Dutton (Staw et al. 1981), it makes several observations and assertions
regarding organizational responses to competitive threats. This hypothesis is discussed at
length as part of the Literature Review chapter of this thesis. It has been both empirically
and theoretically confirmed in a range of studies spanning diverse industries and
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contexts. However, the vast majority of researchers surveyed traditional organizational
structures: the for-profit company competing in an open market. The main contribution
of this thesis is the survey of a novel organizational form, the free and open-source
software development community, in light of the threat-rigidity hypothesis.
There has also been much research in recent years on open-source communities such as
the Apache Software Foundation. This research is valuable and presents numerous
interesting findings, but rarely do these publications describe operational aspects where
time is of the essence, such as responding to a competitive threat. Indeed, one motto of
many open-source software organizations is that "the product is ready when it's ready"
(Chaven 2003). Working according to a schedule is an exceedingly rare practice in the
free and open-source software development world. Accordingly, the study of how this
type of organization reacts when time is of the essence has not been widely pursued.
Moreover, these organizations typically rely heavily on volunteers, some of which have
not been involved in the product's development, to help fix bugs and contribute new
software. Are these volunteers effective in helping address competitive threats, or is the
reliance on a volunteer work force a point of weakness when speed is of the essence?
As explained above, the purpose of this thesis is to explore how a relatively novel
organizational form, the loosely-organized, geographically-distributed, non-profit open-
source software development group, handles competitive threats. The key research
questions include:
" How does the Apache Software Foundation handle reported security issues?
" Does the issue-handling process lead to restrictions in information flow and
centralized decision-making, as predicted by the threat-rigidity hypothesis?
" Does such an organizational structure present advantages and benefits in
responding to competitive threats?
* What is the role of volunteers in scrambling to address competitive threats?
" Can we apply lessons from this organizational structure to traditional ones?
" How can this research inform the broader fields of organizational behavior and
management of innovation?
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1.1 The Apache Software Foundation
The Apache Software Foundation is a non-profit organization that consists of a
community of software developers and the technical infrastructure required to support
them (Coar 2005). The Foundation is one of the oldest and most eminent free and open-
source development communities in the world, established in 1995 and providing more
than 100 different products at no cost. The Apache Software Foundation was chosen as
the focus of study for this thesis due to several reasons discussed below and further in the
Sample Selection section of Chapter 3.
The Foundation's main product, the Apache HTTPD web server, is the dominant product
in its market segment. Nearly 70% of the Internet's web sites are powered by the Apache
server (Netcraft 2005). As this includes a tremendous diversity of server environments,
mission-critical systems, and extremely high-traffic environments, users are quick to
report any issue with the product. Moreover, an issue reported by one user is likely to
affect millions of others. If untreated or improperly treated, these issues can cause
serious damage to the Apache brand and divert customers to other products. The product
faces strong competition from for-profit corporations such as Microsoft and Sun
Microsystems.
Security issues are probably the most severe type of defect reported against the Apache
web server. They can lead to horrendous consequences, such as hackers shutting down
web sites or stealing financial and health care information about millions of customers.
Accordingly, the Apache Software Foundation has recognized the importance of dealing
with reported issues quickly and effectively. The Foundation has implemented a special
and well-defined process for dealing with security issues; that process is discussed in
detail in the Research Methodology chapter of this thesis.
In addition, much of the Apache Software Foundation's processes and data are publicly
available. It is an open and accepting community, and direct contact with the people who
respond to security issues is possible. Such contact, which was part of this thesis, can
substantially improve the researcher's understanding of the relevant processes and issues.
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Furthermore, because of the Foundation's age and the product's adoption rate, the sample
size of security issues is larger than in many other open-source communities. This
enabled a more statistically-significant analysis of the organization's response to
competitive threats.
The following diagram illustrates the open-source software development process. While
it originates in a book about the Linux operating system, the same process is applied in
the Apache Software Foundation, with one relevant difference: "project management"
and the "development team" are one and the same.
Apache Open-Source Software Development Model
Via Code Repository
Via Mailing Lists
Figure 1 - Apache Development Process, Adapted from LinuxCare 2000
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1.2 Expected Findings
As the above section explains, the Apache Software Foundation is a volunteer-based
community of software developers. It is not a traditional software development
organization where employees are paid for their time and are therefore expected to act
according to management directive. Indeed, there is no "management" per se in the
Foundation, as no one member has the authority to direct another. Given the structure of
the Foundation and the threat-rigidity hypothesis, we would make several educated
assumptions about the security issue resolution process.
First, we would expect the burden of fixing security issues to divide roughly equally
among the many different Foundation volunteers working on the project. We would not
expect one or two members to fix a majority of security issues in the long-term, although
over any shorter time period, for example a few months, one member may take an active
leadership role in addressing security issues. To test this assumption, we will attempt to
track the average number of issues addressed per developer: it should be close to one.
We would also expect that more serious issues would be addressed more quickly. While
this makes common sense from a user perspective, it is worth nothing that traditional
software development organizations frequently bundle multiple fixes into one bigger
release to help alleviate the burden of deploying the new release to many customers. In
the open-source software development world, the "release early, release often" (Raymond
1999) mantra is common practice, and we would expect the Apache Software Foundation
to issue new product versions faster than normal when security issues are involved. In
order to test this assumption, we will analyze the time taken for new product releases
overall and separately for those releases driven by serious security issues. We would
expect the time to release security-motivated product versions to be less than the average.
Because the product we have chosen to examine, the Apache HTTPD server, is typically
used by system administrators, third party integration engineers, and other
technologically-advanced or "lead" users, we would expect these users to report a large
percentage of security issues. Specifically, we would expect users to report a much larger
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proportion of security issues than the team discovers by itself. An analysis of security
issues sources will be conducted in order to determine the relative proportion of serious
security issues reported by different types of users.
The threat-rigidity hypothesis predicts that organizations facing a competitive threat will
react by centralizing decision-making, often resulting in a few senior individuals in
management making technical decisions that are typically best left to the engineers most
familiar with the project. At the Apache Software Foundation, the engineers are their
own managers, so we would expect the normal decision-making process to stay in place,
without management interruption. This assumption is difficult to test empirically, but we
will conduct a detailed analysis of the security issue handling process and discuss
opportunities for management interruption.
Finally, the threat-rigidity hypothesis also predicts a restriction in the flow of information
across the organization during times of competitive threat. Because the Foundation
espouses an open culture with publicly-accessible communications forums, we expect
this facet of the hypothesis not to hold true. The detailed analysis of the security issue




This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis and what questions the research
attempts to address. The discussion above describes the Apache Software Foundation,
why it was chosen for this research, and the expected findings of this thesis according to
the threat-rigidity hypothesis. As noted, there has been significant previous research on
the Foundation and other open-source development communities, but the focus of this
thesis is unique: it examines the response of this type of organization under stress from a
competitive threat, where timely action is of the essence. This thesis is the first work to
examine the threat-rigidity hypothesis in relation to this type of an organization.
The rest of the work is structured as follows:
* Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature intended to establish the context for
this work as drawn from previous research in competition, psychology,
technology management, and user-led innovation. The focus of the chapter is on
the relevant aspects of the threat-rigidity hypothesis, especially centralized
decision-making and restrictions in information flow throughout the organization.
* Chapter 3 describes in detail the research methodology and sources of data used
in this study, including the Apache security process and publicly available data
sources.
* Chapter 4 presents the research results regarding incident handling, organizational
response, and participant motivation. It also provides an analysis of the findings.
* Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the findings, draws conclusions, and
provides recommendations for further work.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Research Questions
"Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow."
-Eric S. Raymond
This chapter examines the relevant existing literature in order to provide a context for the
work in this thesis. There exists a substantial body of work on competition, competitive
strategy, and the psychology of individuals and groups responding to threats. There is
also a growing collection of research studies on open-source software, user innovation
communities, and related business models. This literature review reviews the key
findings of interest in these fields, but it does not attempt to provide a detailed view of
any one area of research. Moreover, the findings are reviews only as they related to the
research objectives in this thesis: further references are made available to the interested
reader but are not discussed in depth.
This thesis combines elements from numerous fields, and works will be reviewed with a
focus on how they apply to a distributed user innovation community under stress.
Relevant theoretical and empirical evidence will be cited as appropriate, with a focus on
those aspects of the threat-rigidity hypothesis tested by the Apache Software Foundation.
The key research questions are summarized at the end of the chapter.
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2.1 The Threat-Rigidity Hypothesis
In 1981, Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton published research combining many of the
previously observed phenomena regarding individual, group, and organizational
responses to competitive threats. In this paper, they put forth a set of claims that has
since become known as "The Threat-Rigidity Hypothesis." Staw et al define "threat" as
"an environmental event that has impending negative or harmful consequences for the
entity," where "the entity" may be an individual, a group, or the entire firm (Staw et al.
1981).
In their study, Staw et al found that external threats lead to restriction in information
processing and constriction in decision making, in turn leading to rigid responses at all
organizational levels. The restriction in information processing manifests itself in the use
of fewer communication channels for discussion and consideration of fewer strategic and
tactical alternatives for action. The latter impact is sometimes called "tunnel vision," and
it can be detected by a decline in organizational sensitivity to peripheral cues. The
constriction in decision-making is typically manifested via increased involvement from
executive management, executives making decisions that are best left to middle managers
and staff, less people involved in the decision-making process, and an increased focus on
established processes rather than creative problem-solving.
Staw et al further posit that these rigid responses can be adaptive in a positive way for the
organization, or maladaptive and leading to failure. They suggest that whether rigidity is
good or bad is determined by the degree of environmental change: if the normal, causal
links between firm performance and organizational processes are stable, rigidity is
adaptive in a positive manner. But if the environment has changed significantly, rigidity
is maladaptive and will lead to a deeper crisis.
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The Threat-Rigidity Hypothesis
Reproduced from Gladstein and Reilly (1985), Figure 1
Figure 2 - Key Elements of the Threat-Rigidity Hypothesis
In the twenty-five years since its publication, the work of Staw et al. has become one of
the central theories of organizational behavior under stress. It has been studied by
numerous researchers in diverse fields, including shipbuilding, electronics, government
agencies, activist organizations, farm equipment, and more. Selected field studies are
covered in subsequent sections of this chapter.
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2.2 Restriction in Information Processing
One of the key predictions of the threat-rigidity hypothesis is a restriction in information
flow along different organizational levels: at the individual level where the person
ignores information not related to the current threat, the group level where the group
lapses into "groupthink" (Janis 1982), the organization level where all focus is given to
the current threat at the expense of other issues, and sometimes at the level of
organizational partnerships and joint ventures (Staw et al. 1981).
The restriction in information flow is bothersome because it prevents the individual,
group, or organizational from making fully-informed decisions. However, the existing
literature shows that this restriction is not universal. It may be limited only to
organizations small enough for the current threat to be critical (Audia and Greve 2002),
or may only occur at the organizational-level instead of at all four levels discussed above
(Beckman et al. 2004). For the Apache Software Foundation, we assume no one security
threat is critical: the Foundation's diverse user base and strong reputation prevents any
one threat from destroying the organization.
The restriction in information flow seems to occur at the management levels of
electronics firms (Hoffi-Hofstetter and Mannheim 1999) as well as non-profit drug
treatment centers (D'Aunno and Sutton 1992). The Apache Software Foundation, like
electronics firms, operates in a high-technology arena, but like the drug treatment centers
relies on volunteers and runs a non-profit operation. Both studies pointed to
management-level restriction of information flow as a threat-rigid behavioral response.
Other studies have considered the amount of attention devoted to internal versus external
communications when an organization is faced with a competitive threat (D'Aveni and
MacMillan 1990). As discussed in the findings of this research, the Apache Software
Foundation maintains an open channel of communication with the reporters of security
issues, offering to work together to identify and resolve issues as well as test suggested
-17-
patches. This equal focus on internal and external communications defies existing field
evidence of the threat-rigidity hypothesis (Taylor 2001, Pauwels and Matthyssens 2002).
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2.3 Constriction of Control
The threat-rigidity hypothesis predicts that when faced with a competitive threat,
organizations and groups will constrict control of operations to a smaller group of
individuals than normal for that organization or group (Staw et al. 1981). This is
frequently manifested as more senior individuals, including management, take control of
low-level decision-making processes, make more technical and engineering decisions
than they should, and become less open to alternative ideas, approaches, and strategies.
As a side effect, these managers lose track of other activities, having become too
involved in low-level details.
This part of the threat-rigidity hypothesis has been observed in the electronics industry
(Hoffi-Hofstetter and Mannheim 1999), where the researchers found management to
restrict decision-making to itself during a crisis and gradually adapt over time. It has also
been observed in the withdrawal of firms from international market operations (Pauwels
and Matthyssens 2002), not an area of concern for the Apache Software Foundation
because its marginal cost of operating internationally compared to operating only in the
United States is virtually zero.
Other authors have observed this restriction in information processing in controlled game
situations (Gladstein and Reilly 1985), where the increased stress of having to make
numerous decisions at a rapid pace caused rigid behaviors inside and across participant
groups. As the research shows, Apache Software Foundation volunteers rarely work on
more than one or two security issues at a time, and therefore this field finding does not
apply to the Foundation.
Sometimes the restriction in information processing is natural: for example, drug
treatment centers needing to reduce personnel necessarily turn only to senior
management to make the downsizing decisions (D'Aunno and Sutton 1992). Again, the
Foundation has no such decision to make as it is entirely volunteer-driven. Moreover,
internal competition for resources within the organization is practically non-existent, as
each volunteer does only what he or she wants to do, so the type of internal threat that
19-
leads to rigid behaviors inside the organization (Thomas 1976) is not found at the
Foundation.
Finally, some researchers investigated the theory that these threat-rigid behaviors among
individuals were a function of stress. One of the most dominant factors of stress among
software professionals is fear of professional obsolescence. This fear leads to
individually threat-rigid responses, such as focusing only on the emergent issue at hand
and ignoring alternative technologies or solutions proposed by others, over long periods
of time (Rajeswari and Anantharaman 2003). These individual manifestations of
restriction in information processing are not limited to the engineers but also appear at the
management level, as evidenced by studies that framed threats honestly or as
opportunities for advancement, resulting in different management behaviors (Xie and
Wang 2003). In the Apache Software Foundation, where there are no managers and
advancement is not a concern, we would not expect the same rigid behavior. In fact,
because the Foundation's volunteers are not concerned about being fired, they may learn
from these threat situations more than employees in conventional scenarios (Barnett and
Pratt 2000), allowing true "double-loop learning" (Argyris and Schon 1978) at both the
individual and group levels.
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2.4 Open-Source Software Development
The previous sections of this chapter describe the threat-rigidity hypothesis and related
research in various fields. While the hypothesis has been considered in diverse scenarios,
it has not been studied within the context of an open-source software development
community. This section of the chapter provides a review of some relevant literature on
the composition, function, and form of these distributed innovation groups. In order to
understand the findings of this research, it is important to understand the community-
driven nature of open-source software development, the role played by volunteer
participants, the openness of the community, and the nature of its users as innovators who
are ahead of the mainstream adoption curve.
Open-source software (OSS) is a term that combines technical aspects of software
development, practices of project management and group organization, licensing and
legal terms for the resulting software, and a philosophical approach to the production and
use of software. The focus of this thesis is on group organization, management, and
response to threats.
The premise behind OSS is that the source code for software is made publicly available,
so that that "when programmers can read, redistribute, and modify the source code for a
piece of software, the software evolves. People improve it, people adapt it, and people fix
bugs. And this can happen at a speed that, if one is used to the slow pace of conventional
software development, seems astonishing" (Open Source Initiative 2005).
Many authors have noted the "necessity is the mother of invention" proverb, and
Raymond (1999) relates it to open-source software development by saying that "every
good work of software starts by scratching a developer's personal itch." Developers of
open-source software have numerous motivations, and many have personal or
organizational software requirements that they fulfill by suitably enhancing an existing
open-source software package.
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Among the key motivations are the creative challenge of the work and a feeling of
obligation to the project's community (Lakhani and Wolf 2005). Solving security issues
can be regarded as a creative activity, especially for the highly capable and experienced
programmers who have been involved in the project for a considerable time, as well as
for the programmers who wrote the code in which the security vulnerability is revealed.
One of the main arguments against open-source software is the lack of a support
department or help desk for users. OSS is supported mainly by volunteers using mailing
lists, but there are also commercial organizations providing support and consulting
services. The volunteer-driven support system is effective and efficient (Lakhani and von
Hippel 2003), leading us to expect that a volunteer-driven security issue resolution
system would also be effective. However, as shown by the security process analysis in
the following chapters, the handling of security issues is done over a more private forum
than normal support, perhaps reducing the amount of community learning in the process.
The users of the Apache web server who also contribute patches, documentation, and
feature ideas are a classical example of lead users (von Hippel 1986). Reporting a
security issue and suggesting a patch for it are a classical lead user activity, because the
solution to a security flaw has high value to those lead users reporting the issue. To this
effect, the Apache Software Foundation should go further in providing users with
security information, "user innovation toolkits," or configuration options and tools to
allow custom security solutions to users (Franke and von Hippel 2002).
Coar (2005) notes that the Apache Software Foundation's goal is for each project to
develop a community of people with a common interest in that project. The Foundation
simply "allows code creation to occur within this community." Management of the
community is decentralized and delegated to the community itself, which usually does
not have a set schedule for releases or other activities. Security issues, however, are
unique in that they should be handled urgently, and there may be negative consequences
to not resolving them quickly. The consideration of such issues is missing from much of
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the literature on open-source software development, and it is the central research question
of this thesis.
- 23 -
2.5 Summary of Research Questions
The following is a summary of the primary research questions that formed the basis of
this thesis.
* What aspects of the threat-rigidity hypothesis are shown to be accurate in an
open-source software development organization?
* If any aspects of the threat-rigidity hypothesis are shown to be inaccurate within
this type of organization, why is this so?
* How does the lack of formal management in the Apache Software Foundation
impact the organization's response to competitive threats?
* How does the lack of a schedule or project manager impact the efficiency of the
issue resolution process?
* What aspects of the open-source software development organization help with
threat-rigidity, and which, if any, can be applied in a traditional organization?
* Does the open-source organization behave differently under competitive threats
than it does during normal development?
* What role do the reporters of security issues play in their resolution? Do they
report the issue and disappear? How often do they solve the problem or provide
the code fix?
* What is the process used by the Apache Software Foundation to handle reported
security issues? Is it effective and efficient? How does it compare to processes
used by traditional organizations?
-24-
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
"The idea is to try to give all the information to help others to judge the value ofyour
contribution; notjust the information that leads to judgment in one particular direction
or another."
- Richard P. Feynman
This chapter describes the sources of data used in this study and the research approaches
used to obtain and characterize the data. There is a perception that within free and open-
source software development communities such as the Apache Software Foundation, all
data is publicly available. That perception is largely true, but security issues, due to their
sensitive nature and potentially dangerous consequences, are one of the rare exceptions.
These issues are typically made public only following resolution: in fact, the way most
users find out about an existing security issue is when the product team announces a new
software version that addresses the issue.
Fortunately for this research, however, once a fix for the issue is made available, much of
the relevant history is released into the public domain as well. Moreover, during the past
several years, centralized security issue tracking bodies and mechanisms have been
established. These mechanisms are described in more detail below. The Apache
Software Foundation and other vendors typically fully cooperate with these tracking
bodies and comply with naming conventions, making cross-referencing of security issues
possible.
The major challenge in gathering data for this study involved the notion of timing, which
was central to this thesis. While it was fairly easy to confirm the date of public
announcement for a given issue, it was frequently difficult or impossible to ascertain the
original date when the issue was reported to Apache and therefore the time span for
resolving the issue. The approach used to reconstruct this information is also described
below.
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In the spirit of the Feynman quote above, this thesis relies on publicly-available data
sources. The data used is easy to independently analyze or verify.
3.1 Security Issue Databases
There are several organizations that track security issues for multiple products in
publicly-available databases on the Internet. This section describes three of the leading
such databases, all of which were used to gather security issue data for the purposes of
this thesis. There are several other relevant repositories on- and off-line, but their
contents are nearly always included in one or more of these three databases.
For a given security issue, the following sources present some redundant information,
which allows for cross-referencing and data validation. However, each source typically
contributes at least one unique piece of information which is difficult or impossible to
obtain elsewhere, and so a thorough examination of any specific security issue typically
includes data from all of the sources detailed below.
3.1.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
The CVE database is maintained by MITRE, a not-for-profit organization specializing in
information technology, systems engineering, and related research.' The CVE database
is primarily a naming and numbering scheme for security issues affecting the public.
This includes bugs in numerous products, including the Apache web server, reported by
many organizations and individuals.
The CVE database is not a solution center but simply a resource for uniquely naming and
identifying issues for discussion and resolution. Many other data sources, including the
Apache Software Foundation's own public announcements, use the CVE numbering
scheme when discussing security issues. Even those organizations that assign their own
number to the issue usually include the CVE number for cross-referencing purposes.
Similarly, the CVE entry includes numbers used by other organizations as applicable.
1 Please see http://www.cve.mitre.org/about/ for more information about the CVE database, and
http://www.mitre.org/about/index.html for more information about MITRE.
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Issues are reported to CVE either by the person who identified them, by the entity
affected, or by third parties. Thus, an Apache web server vulnerability may be reported
by a hacker who discovered it, by the Apache Security Foundation, or by a user of the
web server.
A sample CVE entry is shown below. This entry, number 913 for the year 2000, is for a
typical Apache web server vulnerability. Note the cross-reference identification numbers
for multiple other sources:
Nhestndd for nforaaion secrty v nbllty Nn
Re m E&E CVEw EGot Boardr, Couns Proec
CVE-2000-0913
AddixtoraI i~f0?mzrnn is available ftom
(aso sponsoredb t3 -CED
CVE Version: 20040901
This is an entry on the CVE list, which standardizes names for security problems. It was reviewed and accepted by
the CVE Editorial Board before it was added to CVE.
Name CVE-2000-0913
Status[Entry
DsrpinMod rewrite in Apache 1.3.12 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary filsiaDsrpin[RewriteRule1 directive 1is. expanded to Include a filename whose name contains a regular expression.
References






" BUGTRAQ:20001011 Conectiva Linux Security Announcement - apache
* BID:1728
Fore
Figure 3 - Typical CVE Entry
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3.1.2 SecurityFocus and BugTraq
SecurityFocus is a web site owned and operated by Symantec, Inc. with the aim of
providing a central and exhaustive security vulnerability repository.2 The site and its
data are provided free of charge to the public. Like CVE, SecurityFocus contains data on
products from numerous vendors, and information on issues reported by many
individuals and organizations, including third parties not related to the product in
question.
An essential part of the site is the BugTraq mailing list and its searchable archives. The
BugTraq mailing list is one of the earliest sources of security information on the Internet,
dating back to early Usenet adoption. It is still a central discussion point for security
issues, with tens of thousands of subscribers and wide circulation. The BugTraq archives
provide a treasure trove of security issue information, including data on who reported the
issue and when, who researched the issue and how, and details of the issue resolution.
While the BugTraq mailing list originally assigned its own identifiers for security issues,
that practice has ceased. Most of the current BugTraq issues use CVE numbers, and the
archives are searchable by CVE numbers as well.
The screenshot below shows a typical SecurityFocus entry for an Apache web server
vulnerability. Note the CVE cross-reference identification number and the links to
discussion pages for the issue.
2 Please see http://www.securityfocus.com/about for more details about the site.
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Figure 4 - Typical SecurityFocus Entry
The following screen shot shows the "references" tab from the above screen. It illustrates
Security Focus's excellent cross-referencing database. In this case, which is fairly typical
for serious and confirmed security vulnerabilities, vendors other than Apache have
released updates to their products which incorporate the Apache server. SecurityFocus
provides links to that information and directs the user to the appropriate vendor site. In
this case, note for example the updated Linux distributions from Red Hat, Fedora,
TurboLinux, and other vendors.
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Figure 5 - SecurityFocus External References
3.1.3 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
The CERT coordination center was established in 1988 by Carnegie Mellon University's
Software Engineering Institute (SEI). Its aim is to provide an information center
regarding security vulnerabilities of public interest and to foster research in this area. 3
Over time, the CERT center has focused more on tracking consumer-centric security
issues such as flaws in the Windows operating system or Internet Explorer web browser.
It contains relatively little information on server products such as the Apache web server.
3 Please see http://www.cert.org/meet cert/meetcertcc.html for more background information about CERT.
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For example, as of this writing there were only 12 Apache-related advisories in the CERT
database, compared with hundreds in the CVE and SecurityFocus indices.
Unfortunately, CERT assigns its own identification numbers to security issues and does
not automatically cross-reference CVE numbers. However, because issues tracked by
CERT are independently confirmed and of wide interest, they always exist in the CVE
databases with their proper CVE identification; the researcher must manually link the two
sources of data.
However, where the CERT center contains data on a specific security issue, that data is
typically of high quality. More importantly, the CERT center is meticulous in
maintaining and publishing the revision history for any issues it tracks. This provides a
valuable timeline in security issue evolution for researchers. For example, the following
screenshots illustrate a typical Apache-related CERT issue. Note specifically the revision
history in the second screenshot:
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,n .. Original release date June 17, 2002
Last revised: March 27, 2003
c zmt MA. Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
7 Systems Affected
* Web servers based on Apache code versions 1.2.2 and above
* Web servers based on Apache code versions 1.3 through 1.3.24
# Web servers based on Apache code versions 2.0 through 2. 0.36
Overview
There is a remotely exploitable vulnerability in the way that Apache web servers (or other web servers based on their source code) handle data encoded
in chunks. This vulnerability is present by default in configurations of Apache web server versions 1.2.2 and above, 1.3 through 1.3.24 and versions 2.0
through 2.0.36. The impact of this vulnerability is dependent upon the software version and the hardware platform the server is running on.
1. Description
Figure 6 - Typical Apache-Related CERT Advisory
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Revision History
June 17, 2002: Initial release
June 18, 2002: Added Fujitsu vendor statement.
June 18, 2002: Added information about Apache version 1.2.2 and above.
June 18, 2002: Added pointers to Apache versions including 1.3.26.
June 19, 2002: Added Covalent vendor statement.
June 19, 2002: Added Compaq vendor statement.
June 19, 2002: Added Engarde vendor statement.
June 19, 2002: Added SGI vendor statement.
June 19, 2002: Updated Solution section to clarify patch capabilities.
June 19, 2002: Added statement about exploit code for 32-bit platforms.
June 19, 2002: Try to be as clear as possible on the impact (all systems).
June 20, 2002: Added a link to the vulnerability note.
June 20, 2002: Added Hewlett-Packard vendor statement.
June 21, 2002: Added Oracle vendor statement.
June 24, 2002: Added F5 Networks vendor statement.
June 24, 2002: Updated IBM vendor statement to include Websphere information.
June 24, 2002: Added Sun Microsystems Inc. vendor statement.
June 27, 2002: Added Nortel vendor statement.
June 27, 2002: Updated Unisphere vendor statement.
June 28, 2002: Added Alcatel vendor statement.
June 28, 2002: Added Apple vendor statement.
July 08, 2002: Added Cisco vendor statement.
July 15, 2002: Updated Hewlett-Packard vendor statement.
ms
Figure 7 - Parts of the Revision History for a Typical CERT Advisory
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3.2 Sample Selection: Why Apache?
Several other open-source organizations with successful products that were considered
for this thesis include the Sendmail electronic messages transfer agent, the MySQL
relational database system, the PHP scripting language, and the Linux operating system.
In fact, one interesting extension to this thesis would be to conduct similar research at any
one or more of these organizations. The Apache web server was chosen as the focus of
this thesis because of its infrastructure-critical nature and the availability of data from the
Apache Software Foundation.
There has been considerable research on lead users (von Hippel 1986) and their role as
innovators. Von Hippel describes the two essential characteristics of lead users: their
concerns foreshadow general demand, and they expect to obtain high benefits from the
solution to their needs. It is intuitive to see that the first characteristic holds true for
people reporting Apache security issues: their concerns echo general demand because all
users want or would want the security issue addressed. This study attempts to confirm
the second characteristic as well: reporters of security issues obtain benefits both by
having the issue fixed for their own servers and by receiving praise or recognition in the
community. Lead users and the relevant literature were discussed at length in Chapter 2.
The Apache Software Foundation lies at one extreme of the open-source software
development world. It is among the most mature OSS organizations, at more than ten
years old, more than one thousand committers (persons with the technical privileges to
directly modify the software), and thousands of other contributors and users. Its
processes are accordingly different from the many smaller open-source groups, including
projects consisting of a handful (or less) of developers on SourceForge.net or Tigris.org.
These projects are fascinating and worthy of analysis, but there are significant operational
and organizational differences between them and the Apache Software Foundation.
Other large and mature groups, such as the Linux project or the Mozilla Foundation,
would present a more direct analog for comparative studies.
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3.3 Apache Security Team Information
As part of this research, the author initiated contact with members of the Apache
Software Foundation's Security Team. This team consists of volunteers who participate
as developers on several Apache products, including the web server. The Foundation has
approximately one thousand committers, people with the technical access privileges to
directly add source code to the software, but only six serve on this Security Team.4 The
role of this team and the Foundation's security issue handling process in general are
discussed at length in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
The team was a significant source of information for this research. It provided a
computerized record of security incidents including reporting and resolution dates as well
as issue severity. This record is one of the best sources of Apache-specific security
information. A snippet of it is shown on the next page, and the complete record is
included in the Appendix.
4 As of this writing, the six committers are Harmeet Bedi (hbedi(apache.org), Mark J.
Cox (micCdgapache.org), Lars Eilebrecht (lars(apache.org), G.W. Haywood
(ged(&)apache.org), Ben Laurie (benapache.org), and Marc Slemko
(marc@apache.org), identified on the Apache Software Foundation's committer list page
at httD://Deonle.apache.orp/-iim/committers.html.
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<issue>





<p>A buffer overflow in mod-include could allow a local user who is authorised to create server side include (SSI) files
to gain the privileges of a httpd child.</p>
<description>
<affects prod="httpd' version="1.3.32"/>
<affects prod="httpd version= 1.3.31'/>
<affects prod="httpd' version=*1.3.29"/>
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.28"/>
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.27 />
<affects prrod="httpd' version="1.3.26' />
<affects prod="httpd' version="1.3.24" />
<affects prod= httpd' version= 1.3.22" />
<affects prod="httpd' version=1.3.20" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.19 />
<affects prod=httpd" version=1.3.17"
<affects prod="httpd* version: 1.3.14" />
<affects prod ="httpd' version=*1.3.12" />
<affects prod="httpd" version=1.3.11" />
<affects prod= httpd version="1.3.9' />
<affects prcd="httpd" version="1.3.6' />











<p>An issue has been discovered In the mod.ssl module when configured to use the "SSLCIpherSuIte" directive in
IDre u
Figure 8 - Apache Security Team Records (Abbreviated Sample)
As part of this thesis, a computer program was written to analyze the raw log records and
convert them into a format suitable for reading and analysis by Microsoft Excel. The
code for this program, written in the Java programming language, is included in the
Appendix.
While these files are an excellent data source, they are incomplete and sometimes
inaccurate. As part of this research, the author assisted the Apache Security Team in
correcting and completing this file using his findings from other data sources.
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3.3.1 What is the Core Product Team?
As part of this research, contributors to the Apache web server product split into the "core
product team" and external contributors. The core product team is a dynamic group of
people within this project, like all other Apache projects and most open-source software
development communities in general. While various groupings can be used to describe
the core product team, this thesis adopts two fairly simple criteria.
At any given time, the core product team members at any given time are those who are
already Apache committers, people with the technical privileges to submit source code
directly into the product code repository, as listed in (Jagielski 2005). In addition, to
ensure a person was otherwise active on the product, he or she must have made at least
one other code contribution during the year preceding the security incident in question in
order to be considered part of the core product team. These contributions can be verified
by accessing the Foundation's source code repositories as described in the following
section.
Other contributors who help in resolving security issues are referred to as "3rd party" or
"external contributors" as appropriate. They were not part of the core product team at the
time of the specific security issue in question. They may have become part of the core
product team since then, due to additional contributors and the normal dynamics of the
open-source software development community. Conversely, they may have contributed
only one fix and since disappeared entirely. It would be interesting to research whether
contributors to security issues are more likely to become core committers over time than
normal contributors, but this question is left as further work following this thesis.
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3.4 Source Code Repositories
Open-source software development organizations, including the Apache Software
Foundation, use publicly-accessible repositories to hold their software source code. The
Apache Software Foundation uses two such systems: the Concurrent Versions System
(CVS) and Subversion. Some of the data for this research came from the records held in
these source code control systems, which record every change to the software.
Specifically, developers frequently comment on changes they are making, and in the case
of security issues, they sometimes identify the issue they are working on. The screenshot
below illustrates one such example.
Die Edt Yiew go apokmoafts Tools Hels. ........ *.
__77~~ -.,, - - - =-
to httpd-2.1 trunk, but has nothing to do with responses.
r219103 I wrowe 1 2005-07-14 14:22:49 -0700 (Thu, 14 Jul 2005) 1 6 lines
Note two patches available for 2.0.55
There is low hanging fruit here, if anyone's up to committing a few
backports in the next day before a release candidate is tagged ;-)
r219061 I wrowe 1 2.005-07-14 09:51:55 -0700 (Thu, 14 Jul 2005) 1 9 lines
core: strip C-L from any request with a T-E header
resolves external origin. CAN-2005-2088 issues, does not
address internal origin C-L/T-E discrepancies within proxyhttp
Security: CVE CAN-2005-2088
Submitted by: Joe Orton
Reviewed by: Jeff Trawick, Will Rowe
r219059 I wrowe j 2005-07-14 09:47:30 -0700 (Thu, 14 Jul 2005) 1 7 lines
proxy HTTP - ignore C-L and disable keepalive to origin server
Fhhd: Fid af d Preylous R1t* 0fotso eached endl of pag, continued from top
Figure 9 - Apache Web Server Commit Log Example: Fixing CVE CAN-2005-2088
CVS is one of the original open-source code repository systems and is the most widely
used by open-sourced projects (Price and Ximbiot 2005). Between 1995 and 2002, it was
the only system used by the Foundation.
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Subversion is a newer source code control system intended to replace CVS. It contains
virtually all the same features as CVS and more convenience tools for administrators and
users alike (Tigris 2005). The Foundation took care to preserve historical records when
migrating from CVS to Subversion, making this research easier than it would have been
otherwise.
Also included in the source code repositories are change logs for the Apache web server
product. These files contain a list of major new features and changes in each product
version and sometimes contain further information as to who reported or fixed the issue.
An example section of such a file is shown below.
|Aa h[ 9NiJ View nofhttpd/httpd-Jasl .v I~K. Mi aa reetie Odt Jew ao ka rk lools Lt
e ht:jv~pd~~rjecscghpftpltg/..5CANEkwnru Go lRtpa- e httndC1AGES_.a
*)F TixExpires handling in modcache. [Justin Erenkrantz]
k) Alter modexpires to run at a different filter priority to E
proper Expires storage by mod-cache. [Justin Erenkrantz]
Langes with Apache 2.0.52
*) Use HTML 2.0 <hr> for error pages. PR 30732 [AndrAQ Malol
*) Fix the global mutex crash when the global mutex is never a]
due to disabled/empty caches. [Jess Holle <jessh ptc.com>]
*) Fix a segfault in the LDAP cache when it is configured switc
off. [Jess Holle <jessh ptc.com>]
*) SECURITY: CAN-2004-0811 (cve.mitre.org)
Fix merging of the Satisfy directive, which was applied to
the surrounding context and could allow access despite confi
authentication. PR 31315. [Rici Lake <rici ricilake.net>]
) Fix the handling of URIs containing %2F when AllowEncodedSli
Fig.re ----------- -a-p-e-Ch--ge--1gshwing -F -ix --- C
Figure 10 - Sample Change Log showing Fix for CVE-2004-081 1
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In the previous screen shot, the change log shows that Rici Lake fixed this security issue.
Further investigation and cross-referenced data sources such as the CVE database showed
that Rici Lake was also the original reporter of this issue. Therefore we conclude that
this is one of the cases showing a user-led issue discovery and resolution process.
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3.5 Product Release Announcements
Every time a new version of the Apache HTTP server product is released to the public, an
announcement is made on the relevant mailing list. This announcement lists major new
features added and significant bugs fixed. Particular attention is paid to any security
issues that may have been addressed in this release. These release announcements, a
sample of which is shown below, constitute the best source for establishing the level of
user involvement in fixing a specific security issue.
For example, the screenshot below shows that the security issue identified as CVE-2003-
0245 was addressed in Apache version 2.0.46, the issue was originally reported by David
Endler (an employee of iDefense Labs, a computer security research and consulting
firm), and the fix was contributed by Joe Orton (an employee of RedHat, a Linux
solutions provider).
k K- w kCvo f-Lpoadc TooIs Kp____&____
Apache 2.0.46 Released
The Apache Software Foundation and the Apache HTTP Server Project are
pleased to announce the ninth public release of the Apache 2.0
HTTP Server. This Announcement notes the significant changes in
2.0.46 as compared to 2.0.45.
This version of Apache is principally a security and bug fix release.
A summary of the bug fixes is given at the end of this document.
of particular note is that 2.0.46 addresses two security
vulnerabilities:
Apache 2.0 versions 2.0.37 through 2.0.45 can be caused to crash in
certain circumstances. This can be triggered remotely through mod day
and possibly other mechanisms. The crash was originally reported by
David Endler <DEndler at iDefense.com> and was researched and fixed by
Joe Orton <jorton at redhat.com>. Specific details and an analysis of the
crash will be published Friday, May 30. No more specific information
is disclosed at this time, but all Apache 2.0 users are encouraged to
upgrade now.
[http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-02451
Apache 2.0 versions 2.0.40 through 2.0.45 on Unix platforms were
vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack on the basic authentication
module, which was reported by John Hughes <john.hughes at entegrity.com>.
A bug in the configuration scripts caused the apr_password validate()
function to be thread-unsafe on platforms with crypt_ro, including
AIX and Linux. All versions of Apache 2.0 have this thread-safety
problem on platforms with no crypt_rO and no thread-safe crypto,
Figure 11 - Product Release Announcement Example
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
"However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results."
- Sir Winston Churchill
This chapter presents both the data collected during the research and an analysis of that
data. The data collected is fairly voluminous, so summaries or excerpts will be used as
appropriate; additional detailed data is available in the Appendix. The results are
presented in light of the theoretical assumptions of the threat-rigidity hypothesis,
discussed in the previous chapters, with a focus on answering the research questions of
this thesis.
The findings are divided into the following sections. First, the Apache Software
Foundation's security issue resolution process is discussed in detail. The process
includes multiple optional steps that may be followed depending on the specific details of
the issue in question. One of the main objectives of this research was to document and
analyze the Apache security issue handling process in order to understand its benefits as
well as its shortcomings. Specifically, the question is whether the process contributes to,
prevents, or is natural with respect to the restriction of information flow and
centralization of decision-making aspects of the threat-rigidity hypothesis.
Next, the types of issues reported, their sources, the actions of the team, and participant
involvement in the process are explored. Because the server is so widely used in diverse
and heterogeneous environments, we expect a broad range of types of issues and some
diversity in how these issues are found initially. It will be interesting to see how much
work is performed by the reporter of the issue in finding, discussing, and solving it, and
how much of the work is done by other volunteers. This participation of issue reporters
as well as third parties in resolving security issues speaks to the centralization of
decision-making during this stressful process as well as to the restriction in information
flow. If the process allows input from all interested parties, it does not constrict
information flow.
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The frequency of new product releases will also be examined, along with the relationship
between the release frequency and the magnitude of security issues addressed in the new
release. It will be shown that new product versions which address serious security issues
do tend to arrive faster than average for a new release, but not much faster. This
observation confirms that the release process, including its community consensus
requirements, is not violated or modified for security-driven product releases, thereby
ensuring that decision-making is not centralized to those working on the security issue.
As previously noted, the majority of the Apache Software Foundation's data is publicly
available. Some of the data, such as new product release dates and what product version
addresses what security issue, is easy to find and validate. Other data, such as the
severity classification of a security issue, is more subjective, but the ratings assigned by
the Foundation itself will always be used to ensure data consistency. In fact, there was at
least one case where this research revealed an inconsistency in the Security Team's data:
these inconsistencies were reported to the Team, addressed by the Foundation, and the
updated data was used in this research.
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4.1 The Apache Security Process
This section describes the process used by the Apache Software Foundation to handle
reports of security issues related to its products. While virtually every for-profit software
organization has a process in place for handling security reports, not all open-source
communities do. The Foundation has developed and refined its process over the past
decade, partially in anticipation of widening product usage and increasing consequences
for security issues, and partially in response to past accidents and mishandling thereof. It
is important to understand this process in order to analyze its efficiency and efficacy in
dealing with security issues, restriction of information flow, centralization of decision-
making, and other threat-rigid behaviors.
The original process for handling security issues at the Foundation was neither well-
defined nor well-documented. The initial group of contributors was small, consisting of
only eight engineers, and each contributor was familiar with a large percentage of the
source code. Accordingly, each person could help in analyzing security issues and fixing
them quickly. However, as the group of contributors grew along with the size of the code
base, the need for a better process became apparent. The current process was established
in the late 1990s by several of the original founders of the Foundation. It has been
proven adequate over the past eight years, especially in the face of rapid Foundation
growth and product diversification.
The security process is different from most other Apache processes, and indeed from
most other open-source development processes, in two key ways. First, it is more
centralized than other processes: there is one Apache Security Committee (ASC)
responsible for coordinating all Apache security responses. The membership of this
committee, listed previously in this thesis, consists of senior core members who have
typically been involved with the Foundation for several years. The members tend to have
an understanding of numerous Apache products, not just their own. This is again
different from most open-source processes, whereby contributors are primarily involved
with one product that they use routinely.
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The other key difference between the security process and other processes at Apache is
its privacy concerns. Because the information discussed during this process presents a
potential security exploit, which would impact millions of web sites, it is kept private.
The discussions take place on lists which are not open to the public, and the information
is made available to the public only once a fix has been made. While the original process
was more open, it also facilitated rapid exploits of reported security issues in the form of
hackers attacking vulnerable systems before the administrators could update the Apache
product, so the revised process is significantly more closed. However, an emphasis is
placed on including all relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process: the original
reporter, the entire security team, the entire product team, and sometimes key third parties
such as those working for external threat databases.
The following is a detailed description of the process, which has been proven adequate in
the face of the Apache products' explosive user base growth as well as the Foundation's
diversifying product line. The stage numbers in the description correspond to the
numbers in the process flow diagram following the detailed description below.
Stage Stage Description
Number
1 A possible security issues is reported to the Apache Software Foundation via
an electronic message to the designated address, securityapache.org. This
address is monitored by all members of the Apache Security Committee
(ASC), and its contents or archives are not open to detailed public review.
The report may come from a user stumbling upon the issue, a paid consultant
conducting a product security audit, or even another Apache developer who
happened to notice suspect code or behavior while working on another section
of the product. Section 4.2 of this thesis examines the distribution of security
issue sources.
Please note that there is no standard template or web page for the reporter to
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fill out. The reports come in as free-form electronic mail messages. While
this can be construed as a weakness in the process, the average technical
competency level of issue reporters is high enough that he or she includes
much of the relevant information a-priori without a need for further
prompting. Once an issue is made public, it is typically entered into the
official product issue tracking software, where detailed information about the
affected operating systems and other details are recorded.
2 The ASC acknowledges the issue report by sending an electronic message
back to the reporter. The ASC requests that the issue be kept private until
further notice, in order to allow for further diagnosis and repair efforts as
necessary. If any relevant information is missing, such as what product
version the reporter was using, then the ASC requests that this information be
submitted as well.
3 The ASC rejects any obviously inappropriate issues. This includes spain
messages to the securitvapache.org address, messages not related to
security issues, messages related to issues which have been publicly addressed
in the past, and messages not related to Apache products at all.
These messages are silently ignored, and the reporter is usually not provided
any feedback. While this may seem unprofessional, it has been deemed
necessary in order to not overwhelm the volunteers on the ASC.
4 Once the issue is accepted by the ASC as relevant, further diagnosis and
triage are conducted. The ASC may request additional details from the issue
reporter. The primary goal of the ASC at this stage is to identify the relevant
product or product section and therefore the relevant developer team to
contact. The ASC is not expected to fix security issues by itself, but it is
expected to conduct sufficient triage to locate the correct developers for fixing
the issue.
Once the relevant product is identified, the ASC forwards all the available
information on the issue, including the original issue reporter's identity and
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contact information, to the product team.
For some products, the forwarding address is the Project Management
Committee (PMC), while other products have dedicated security addresses,
such as securitydtomcat.apache.org. Each product team must provide the
ASC with a forwarding address and is accountable for its own security issue
resolution.
Once the issue is reported to the product team, that team conducts an in-depth
analysis using all available information. The team attempts to reproduce the
issue reported and may ask the original reporter for more information. The
product team makes one of three possible decisions: the issue is invalid, the
issue has been addressed already in new versions of the software, or the issue
is valid and further work is necessary.
5 One possible decision for the project team is to reject the issue as having been
addressed already in versions of the software that followed the reporter's
version. This happens when the user is using an old version, or when a fix
was independently made a short time before the issue was reported to the
product team. This is the least frequent of the three possible product team
decisions described in stages 5, 6, and 7.
When this happens, the original reporter is encouraged to update to the latest
version as soon as possible, but typically no further action is taken. If the
issue had been previously leaked to the public, then an announcement is made
with the same message, urging everyone to update their product versions.
6 The product team rejects the issue as invalid. As mentioned above, the ASC
has some knowledge of most Apache products, but it is not always detailed
operational knowledge, and it may be slightly out of date. Accordingly,
issues occasionally slip through the ASC that the product team is able to
dismiss as invalid.
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One common reason for an issue to be declared as invalid stems from
inappropriate usage of the product. For example, a user reporting a security
issue caused by using a 3rd party extension to an Apache product would see
that issue rejected as inappropriate, and the product team would suggest that
the user contact the 3 rd party library provider so that it may fix the product. If
the extension is widely used, the product team may announce this issue on the
public mailing list and it may also assist the 3rd party provider in addressing
this issue. However, the official Apache process would be over at this point.
7 If the product team verifies that the issue is valid and that it has not been fixed
in other versions, work proceeds towards fixing the issue. Again, the issue
reporter may be contacted for more details, but usually the team knows the
code well enough to proceed without further assistance.
If particular developers are associated with the section of the product where
the issue is reported, these developers are often contacted by the product team
and asked to assist with the process. Sometimes these developers have been
inactive for a prolonged period of time, but as the original authors of parts of
the code, their opinion is respected and they are also the most qualified to fix
the issue.
Frequently, it is during this step that these more veteran, but less involved,
core team members become temporarily involved in order to help fix the
issue.
The product team notifies the ASC of its plan and progress.
8 The ASC continues to remain in contact with the issue reporter, updating him
or her on the progress to date and continued plans for addressing the issue. At
this point, the ASC may contact external parties that track security issues,
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9such as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie
Mellon University,5 or the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
initiative at MITRE.6 These organizations assign a case number to the
security issue for further tracking, communication, and archival purposes.
In parallel to the ASC activities in stage 8 above, the product team works on
fixing the issue. Once a code fix is available, it is first tested by the product
team. If the fix is found satisfactory, the product team notifies the ASC of the
results. The fix is also committed into the project's source code repository,
where lead users who track the repository may download and use it before any
formal announcement is made.
10 The ASC or the product team may request the original reporter to help with
verifying the fix. The ASC may also advise the same third parties (CERT and
CVE) of the progress to date, indicating a fix is available. This is an
important communications measure, because many organizations that use
Apache products rely on these third parties to disseminate security updates to
them.
11 After updating the source code repository and notifying the ASC, the product
team issues a new official release of the product. The release is announced on
public mailing lists, with special emphasis given to the security issues
addressed. Credit is given to the issue reporter as appropriate, and users are
encouraged to update to the latest version as soon as possible.
5 For more details on CERT, please see Chapter 3.
6 For more details on CVE, please see Chapter 3.
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The Apache Security Process
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The process is fairly efficient. Step 2, notification of the security team and an
acknowledgement to the issue reporter, is virtually always completed within a few hours
of the reporter's message to the team.
Steps 3 and 4 typically require a day or two for analysis and triage. The team is careful to
assess each issue thoroughly prior to rejecting it. The process for identifying the relevant
Apache product is fairly straightforward, as most of the issues are reported against the
web server itself, and the remaining issues are evenly split among less than a handful of
other projects that can have server-level security issues.
There is further variance in steps 5, 6, and 7, depending on the project team availability
and the complexity of the issue. These steps can take a few hours, typically in the case
where the issue is invalid, or a few days, where the issue requires deeper analysis or is
difficult to reproduce. Cases that require further information from the issue reporter take
longer.
Step 9, actually fixing the issue, also has high variance, taking anywhere from a couple of
hours to a week. Some fixes are as trivial as correcting the documentation or removing a
misleading comment in the code, but others involve significant code changes to key data
structures in multiple modules of the software. Accordingly, testing these patches can
also be a significant effort, sometimes requiring as much work as the fixing effort itself.
Finally, a new product release is issued containing the fixes as appropriate. For critical or
important issues, a release is typically made as soon as the fix is available. For less
important releases, the code is fixed in the repository, but no release may be made until
additional features and fixes are implemented. In these cases, users are free to download
and build the code from the repository, but there is no official product release made. The
cases of users downloading specific patches as opposed to official releases are not
included in the analysis for this thesis, as they are assumed to be a negligible fraction of
the overall product adoption.
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During the entire process, the original reporter and entire product team are kept in the
loop. While the Security Team steers the process, it does not make technical decisions on
behalf of the product team, and these decisions are made using the normal voting and
consensus guidelines of the Apache Software Foundation. Accordingly, the process does
not lead to excessive centralization of decision-making, and this aspect of the threat-
rigidity hypothesis does not hold in this context.
However, when looking at the restriction of information flow aspect, we observed that
virtually all others Foundation processes are completely open to the public. The security
issue handling process is not open to the public, and although it is closed for good
reasons, it still represents a restriction in information flow. This restriction forfeits many
of the benefits of the open-source software development community, such as having
more people look at every code fix or issue, but the Foundation believes this sacrifice is
necessary in order to mitigate the impact of a security issue becoming publicly known
prematurely. Therefore, although there technically is a restriction in information flow
compared to normal Foundation processes, we do not find it to be the same type of
restriction predicted by the threat-rigidity hypothesis.
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4.2 Security Issue Severity Classification
There have been more than 1,000 security issues reported to the Apache Security Team,
judging from the archives of the security(&apache.org mailing list. Only a small portion
(55, or less than 5.5%) is verified as a legitimate issue and receives a tracking number
such as the one provided by the CVE database described in Chapter 3. The mailing list
archives, which are private and cannot be published as part of this thesis, contain a large
amount of spam messages: 98% according to a recent estimate conveyed in private
discussions with one Security Team member. The team sifts through these messages
without comment, focusing instead on the actual or apparent issues reported.
Like other software organizations, the Foundation has developed a classification scheme
for security issues according to their severity. The classification serves two purposes: it
focuses the attention of developers should simultaneous issues arise and helps convey the
significance of issues to users. The latter is especially important when issues become
publicly known before a fix is available for them, and when a fix is available but requires
a substantial upgrade effort. Some server administrators will not upgrade their
installation unless an issue falls in the "Critical" or "Important" categories. For our
purposes, the classification serves to divide security issues into "serious" or not and for
statistical analysis purposes: the effects of threat-rigidity should be most pronounced for
the most serious security issues and less evident for less serious issues.
The Apache Software Foundation's security classification is repeated below (Cox 2004):
Severity Category Description
Critical A vulnerability rated with a Critical impact is one which could
potentially be exploited by a remote attacker to get Apache to
execute arbitrary code (either as the user the server is running as,
or root). These are the sorts of vulnerabilities that could be
exploited automatically by worms.
Important A vulnerability rated as Important impact is one which could
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result in the compromise of data or availability of the server. For
the Apache web server this includes issues that allow an easy
remote denial of service (something that is out of proportion to
the attack or with a lasting consequence), access to arbitrary files
outside of the document root, or access to files that should be
otherwise prevented by limits or authentication.
Moderate A vulnerability is likely to be rated as Moderate if there is
significant mitigation to make the issue less of an impact. This
might be because the flaw does not affect likely configurations, or
it is a configuration that isn't widely used, or where a remote user
must be authenticated in order to exploit the issue. Flaws that
allow Apache to serve directory listings instead of index files are
included here, as are flaws that might crash an Apache child
process in Apache 1.3.
Low All other security flaws are classed as a Low impact. This rating
is used for issues that are believed to be extremely hard to exploit,
or where an exploit gives minimal consequences.
In this research, we use the classification in two ways: to categorize security issues and to
categorize product versions as "security-driven" or not. A "security-driven" product
release is defined as one addressing at least one issue of critical or important severity.
The complete record of security
below.7































































































































































































































Of the 55 issues in the security records five (9.1%) are classified as critical, twenty four
(43.6%) as important, twelve (21.8%) as moderate, and fourteen (25.5%) as low. This is
fairly remarkable considering the product team itself is responsible for categorizing
security issues: one might think that the team, having developed the buggy code itself,
would down-play the significance of issues. Instead, more than 52% of issues are in the
top two most serious categories.
Figure 13 - Security Issues by Severity
When examining the average resolution time from when the issue is reported (either
privately to security(alapache.org or via public announcements) to when a release is made
that addresses the issue, one sees that the response is faster when the issue severity is
higher, as one would hope.
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Figure 14 - Average Resolution Time by Severity
The average time to address critical issues is 35.2 days, important issues 53.38 days,
moderate issues 90.5 days, and low issues 97.6 days, for an overall average resolution
time of 74.0 days. It is interesting to note that the average resolution time for moderate-
and low-severity issues is fairly similar: this reflects the fact that the low-priority issues
are frequently rolled into another product version, whereas critical or important issues
typically have a product release made specifically to address them once a fix is available.
However, one might also expect security-driven product releases to be issued more
frequently than standard releases. This does not appear to be the case, as shown in the
following two tables. Each table shows the release history for one Apache server branch:
1.3 and 2.0 have been the two major branches over the past six years. The 1.3 branch has
been in maintenance mode for much of this time, as users have been encouraged to
migrate towards the 2.0 branch. However, when important security issues arise in a 1.3
version, they are addressed and a new release made; the product team has been very
reluctant to force users to upgrade.
The following charts include releases intended for General Availability or a wide-scope
beta test. They do not include releases that were tagged in the source code control
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repository but never made available to the public, or releases that were only available for
a few days and recalled due to severe issues.
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As the graph shows, there is a fairly small variance between the overall average time
between releases, 83 days, and the averages for security-driven (85 days, or within 3% of
the normal time) and non-security-driven (79 days, or within 5% of the normal time)
releases.
The data for the Apache 1.3 branch is consistent in terms of percentages and variance.
As mentioned above, this version of the product is in maintenance mode, and releases are
generally less frequent because of that. The focus of development was shifted to the
Apache 2.0 branch in 1999.
As with the other tables in this work, the time since previous release is measured in days.
Apache 1.3 Releases (General Availability I
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Figure 16 - Apache 1.3 Average Time between Releases
In this branch of the software, the situation is similar to the 2.0 branch; the overall
average time between releases is 122 days. The average for security-driven releases is
118 days, within 4% of the normal time, and the average for non-security-driven releases
is 127 days, also within 4% of the normal time.
This suggests that security issues do not cause a panic or emergency situation within the
Foundation. Issues are reported, fixes are made, and the product is released when the fix
is ready. Moreover, the data shows that the normal processes of code validation, testing,
and release by team consensus are all still followed for security-driven releases as well as
normal releases. This negates the threat-rigidity hypothesis' prediction that due to
centralized decision-making, security-driven releases should emerge significantly faster
than the average release.
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4.3 User Participation
As part of the research questions motivated by the user-led innovation nature of open-
source software development, we examine the level of involvement of users in the
security issue identification and handling process.
Users of the Apache HTTP web server are technically-savvy individuals: they download,
install, and configure web servers, sometimes for mission-critical applications in complex
environments. Because the product is popular and frequently used to serve content to the
public from a company's front page, it is also independently tested and audited for
security issues by users and third party consultants alike.
Unfortunately, identifying the reporters of security issues is not always easy or even
possible. Issues are sometimes reported anonymously. Other times the team fails to
disclose the identity of the reporter, whether intentionally in response to the reporter's
request or unintentionally by an error of omission.





60% 72.73% o Extemal Users
50% * Apache security team





Figure 17 - Sources of Reported Security Issues
Out of the 55 issues that received a CVE identifier, the majority (more than 70%) were
reported by external users who were not part of the Apache Software Foundation in any
way. The core product team found and reported most of the remaining issues, accounting
for approximately 20% of the total. The Apache Security Team itself reported two
issues, possibly in the process of testing or verifying a different report.
-61-
While the 20% figure may seem small, it is actually significant. One must assume that
the core product team stumbles upon many real or possible security issues during regular
development and testing. There is nothing to compel any team member to report these
issues; a fix could be made silently and included in the next product version silently as
well. However, it appears that the individuals working in the core product team have a
high ethical motivation, and they choose to report in public those security issues that
become visible to them, even before any users encounter the problem. Perhaps this is an
indication of the team's awareness of the level of stress associated with fixing these
issues once they are publicly known, or perhaps it is addressing a simple need: as
mentioned previously, these developers are also strong and frequent users of the product.
The users within the "External" or non-Apache category can be broken down further
according to the type of employment or activity they were doing when they found the
security issue. For this analysis, they are divided into 5 groups:
" Security analysts who are paid to conduct audits ofproducts such as the Apache
server. These companies, such as iDefense Labs or Next Generation Security
Software, routinely inspect new product releases for security issues, develop tools
to test security, and cooperate with the Foundation on resolving these issues.
Their employees are highly knowledgeable about security issues on both the
theoretical and practical levels, and they tend to monitor the CVE and related
databases described in Chapter 3 above on a regular basis.
" Employees of companies that provide services utilizing the Apache server, such as
web site design firms or system integrators. These firms typically run audits of
new product versions and also stress-test various product features as part of their
normal operations. They are not, however, as dedicated to finding and reporting
security issues as the analysts in the first category. Moreover, they are generally
not as knowledgeable as the specialists in the security analysis firms described
above.
" Independent security analysts and "hackers." These are people who report issues
independently of any organization; they do not appear to be users of the product,
- 62 -
but rather hackers or independent consultants providing security assessments. For
them, finding and reporting issues is partially a matter of pride, a way to establish
credibility in the technical arena, or perhaps a way to draw the attention of and
gain employment with security analysis firms. They are geographically
dispersed: this research found issues reported by hackers in Russia, England,
Italy, China, and the United States.
* Normal users who just happen to run across an issue while using the product.
Again, "normal users" of the Apache web server are typically experienced
technical professionals who have set up the server for their organization. They
are webmasters or server administrators, and they typically conduct a limited set
of tests when deploying new product versions.
* Users of another product. Because the Apache server is a central infrastructure
component for many applications, sometimes users note bad behavior in those
applications and trace it to the server. This is a fairly difficult debugging effort,
so this category is typically very small.
External Sources of Issues
3% m Software security
analysis firm






* User of another product
Figure 18 - Breakdown of External Sources of Issue
As the breakdown diagram above shows, software security firms are the leading reporters
of security issues in the Apache web server, with approximately 35% of the issues. This
is not surprising: in recent years, the number of these firms and their level of
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sophistication have greatly increased. They employ various automated tools as well as
experienced analysts with complete knowledge of historically buggy areas in the product.
These companies conduct some audits on their own, and other times they are hired by a
third party that relies on the product to independently test it.
The next leading sources of issues are software services companies and independent
hackers. While neither typically has the resources (time or money) to spend on security
auditing that the dedicated analysis firms do, both of these groups have strong
motivations to find and report issues. Software services companies provide consulting
and support services to clients that use the Apache product: it is in their financial interest
to resolve these issues and do so quickly, lest they lose clients to a competing platform.
Independent consultants and hackers have a different interest in finding and reporting
issues: they want to gain recognition and credibility, which typically leads to employment
with the security analysis firms.
This level of involvement from external users is encouraging in light of the threat-rigidity
hypothesis, because it shows that the team does not restrict information flow to itself.
Rather, input from external users is welcomed and taken into full consideration.
Looking at the statistics for external reporters, and counting all reports from one security
analysis firm as one source even if they come from different analysts, one sees the
following:
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Figure 19 - Issues Reported by External Reporters Histogram
Most reporters only report one issue: 19 of them. In fact, the median for issues reported
per reporter is 1.0, although the average is 1.48. Four people have reported two issues
each, three people three issues each, and one person has reported four issues: that
"person" is actually a security analysis firm, iDefense Labs.
It is somewhat surprising that "normal users" only reported a small minority of issues.
There are two complementary explanations for this observation. The first is that the
Apache product is technically mature and extremely well tested by millions of users over
the past decade; accordingly, serious security issues are not only rare but they only
surface in highly unusual configurations or environments. By definition, only a few users
run these configurations, so the opportunity for these bugs to arise is low. This
explanation is partially corroborated by the nature of recent security issues: they tend to
be highly specialized configurations set up by security analysts.
For an illustration of three types of reports, consider the following issues. First, a report
from a security analysis firm, Watchfire, regarding a theoretical security issue called
"HTTP Request Smuggling." The report was submitted to securityoa/apache.org as
requested, and the normal process was followed to fix the server before the report was
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Figure 20 - Security Analyst Issue Report Sample Page 1
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Figure 21 - Security Analyst Issue Report Sample Page 2
Next, consider an issue report from an independent hacker: the report is sent via
electronic mail directly to the BugTraq mailing list discussed in Chapter 3 and not to the
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Apache Security Team as requested. The analyst provides a script built from scratch to
demonstrate the vulnerability. The report shows a level of technical maturity but contains
spelling errors and other less professional indicators.
Efe Eckt M~ew rAO ffoolnerhs tools .0
r( http://archives neohapsis comarchivestfuildisclosure/2004-1 /1195.hml Go snsg t
[Full-Disclosure] DoS in Apache 2.0.52 ?
From: Chintan Trivedi (chesschintan@gmaiftcor)
Date: Mon Nov 01 2004 - 03:57:42 CST
* Messages sorted by: [ date 1 thread 1 [ subject I [ author 1
Hi,
I was doing some testing on Apache webserver ver 2.0.52 (unix) and
previous versions. Just found that a special type of request consumes
lot of CPU usage and hangs the webserver. It even hangs other services
like ssh, ftp ..





Figure 22 - Independent Hacker Bug Report (Excerpt 1)
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Figure 23 - Independent Hacker Bug Report (Excerpt 2)
Finally, consider a possible issue reported by a "normal user" who is actually a web site
administrator. He noticed strange requests in his site log file and realized Google was
providing search results for a page that had no external links and therefore should not
have been visible to the outside world. That prompted him to investigate the issue and
ask for advice on the mailing list. Further discussion ensued on the list, where
workarounds and tests were devised, and all parties collaborated with the Apache
Security Team to resolve the issue.
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also hanged up. The time required for the attack was just maximum 5
minutes,
I am not sure whether it is a valid DoS or not. Replacing the <space>
with any other char will break the connection just after a few
lines(1 30 or so) of header. Checking the
httpd-2.0.52/server/protocol.c file i see the code for the mime
headers. It checks for the first char of the header. If it is a "space" it
considers it as an extension to the previous line header. The problem
seems to be similar to the advisory published by Guninsky few weeks
ago -> http://Mww.guninski.comihttpdl.html thought its a bit
different. That fix was for the long request field header when the
header line is extended in the next line using space.
Well i guess 8K limit for the number of headers filled with spaces is
quite huge. Its enuf to DoS the server using a few threads.
You can check the attached C file to test it. The file is compiled on
windows system using VC++ 6.0.
------- POC ---
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I'm running a modest Apache 1.3.19 server on Mandrake 7.2, with a 2.4
kernel. No cgi's or PHP support, though I do have server-info and
server-status enabled for local reference only.
I noticed some hits in the Apache access log for two files, index.old
and index.older, which were backups of index.html left in my docroot
directory. It wasn't hard to figure out that Google was directing
people to these files; what I couldn't understand was how Google knew
they were there.




...and if you try this yourself in Internet Explorer, you'll find that
Apache is ignoring my index.html and is giving you a formatted directory
of the docroot directory as though there were no index page.
The differences between the ?M and the ?S versions are not blatantly
obvious, at least not to me.
I'm writing to Bugtraq in frustration because I can't find this documented
ANYWHERE, and it could be a nastier surprise to others than it was to me*.
What other little surprises like this exist, and can I do something in my
Apache config to take control of them?
*Before you tell me about robots.txt, htaccess and so forth, let me
Figure 24 - "Normal User" Issue Report Sample
Note that the user is aware that this might be a more serious issue to others and easily
admits that he is not sure if this is a security flaw. Instead, he asks for help, better
documentation, and commentary. In subsequent discussions, this user helped test the
fixes proposed by the development team, and he was properly credited in the resulting
CVE database record and Apache release announcements.
The second explanation for the relative minority of serious security issues reported by
normal users is that these users actually report many of their issues directly to the team;
these issues are real but not significant enough to merit widespread distribution or a CVE
number. This explanation is also partially corroborated when one examines the release
notes for any particular Apache version: references are frequently made to "possible, but
unlikely or insignificant" security issues reported by a particular user and addressed by
the core team. Because these issues are judged (by both the reporter and the team) to not
present a widespread security risk, they are not passed through the normal security
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process described above. The public is made aware of them only when the release is
made. History has shown this process to be true: over the past five years, there have been
no such issues that were judged insignificant by the team and then became a widespread
risk resulting in CVE / CERT advisories.
Nonetheless, one extension to this work would be to collect and analyze these small user
reports and compare their composition to that of the serious security issues included in
this research. It would also be beneficial to contact these users who reported an issue,
whether it received a CVE tracking number or not, and survey them regarding the effort
they expended in finding and reporting the issue.
Next, consider user participation in actually fixing issues. As the following data shows,
users participate in fixing issues in several ways. Sometimes the person who reported the
issue submits a fix, either at the time of reporting or after further discussions. Other
times, the person drops out of sight after reporting the issue and the core product team
comes up with a fix by itself. Perhaps most interesting, sometimes a third party is
responsible for the fix: these may be people contacted discreetly by the Apache Security
Team, or they may be individuals who stumbled upon the same security issue and are
reporting it after the original report.
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Who Fixes the Issues?
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o 3rd Party
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Figure 25 - Breakdown of Sources of Issue Fixes
As the above diagram shows, the vast majority of issues are fixed by the product team.
The probable reason for this difference is that the Apache web server product is a
complex and mature software package with many components, layers, and other
complicating issues. Properly identifying the relevant code in order to fix it, and then
fixing the code without introducing regression defects, is a very difficult task; it is
beyond the capability of most users.
If this explanation is true, one might argue that correcting security issues is beyond the
capability of most Apache developers as well, and therefore we should see a small
minority of developers who fix more than their share of issues. The following tables shed
light on this theory.
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Figure 26 - Issues Fixed per Fixer
The above table shows that most fixers only fix one issue: indeed, the median number of
issues fixed per fixer is 1.0. However, the average is 1.72, 16% higher than the 1.48
issues reported per reporter. Furthermore, the percentage of fixers who fix more than one
issue is 31.03%, slightly greater than the 29.63% of reporters who report more than one
issue.
The difference really becomes evident in the top fixers versus the top reporters
breakdown. An examination of people who report or fix four issues or more shows the
following:
Issues Top Issues
Top Reporters Reported Fixers Fixed
DE 4 JO 8
GG 3 WR 5
MM 3 JT 5






Table 4: Top Fixers versus Top Reporters
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1 2 3 4 More
Number of Issues
As the table shows, the top fixers addressed significantly more issues than the top
reporters, and there are more of them. An examination of the source code repository
shows that these top fixers are among the most senior tenured developers in the Apache
Software Foundation, including one of the original founders and initiators of the Apache
web server product. In addition, several of the top fixers, including JO, have software
security-related responsibilities in their regular employment. The top fixers handled
more than half of all security issues, whereas the top reporters reported less than a quarter
of the same set of issues.
Again, the plurality of issue reporters shows that the security issue handling process is
open to external input and does not feature excessive restrictions in information flow.
Although many security issues are fixed by the top fixers, each fix, independent of its
source, is still validated by the product team, and each product version is approved by the
usual consensus-based Foundation voting procedures. This helps prevent centralized
decision-making by just one or two developers, even if they are top fixers or otherwise
senior members of the team. The overall process is efficient and does not suffer from
threat-rigid behaviors.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Further Work
"All of the most significant open source communities have some centralized 'Cathedral'
elements - look at the way Linus controls what goes into the Linux kernel, or the way
Larry Wall controls what goes into the design of Perl. But the most successful open
source communities surround that cathedral with a bazaar that is significantly open."
- Tim O'Reilly (referring to Raymond 1999)
This chapter presents conclusions from the research, notes the limitations of this thesis,
and makes recommendations for further work. In considering the conclusions and scope
of this study, it is helpful to remember the context and time frame of the research. The
work was conducted over approximately seven months while the researcher was engaged
in full-time study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. While virtually all the
data gathered for this research is publicly available, it is highly fragmented and its
assembly is a time-consuming and challenging task. Furthermore, it is only in the past
several years that centralized security issue tracking databases have begun thoroughly
cross-referencing and linking entries. Information on issues reported in the year 2000 or
earlier is more difficult to gather and cross-check. In addition, while the current Security
Team members have been active for the past several years, the security process before the
year 2000 was very different, the team members were different, and little public data
exists regarding issues from that time period.
The main goal of this research was to examine how one example of an open-source
software development organization staffed by volunteers, the Apache Software
Foundation, responds to one type of competitive threat: the threat of losing users and
brand quality due to a security flaw in the Apache HTTP web server product. Because
there are competing products and no licensing or contractual costs for users when
switching web server products, this type of threat is presented as a potentially significant
source of threat. The intent of the research was to then examine the response to the
threat, specifically whether the behavioral responses at the personal, group, and
organizational levels matched those predicted by Staw et al. (1981) in their threat-rigidity
hypothesis.
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This examination of the Apache Software Foundation was done in the context of previous
work on user-led innovation (von Hippel 1988). Finding and fixing security issues in this
complex software product is a challenging and creative activity. Professional analysts
and independent hackers alike go to significant lengths to create unusual testing
scenarios, write analyses of discovered security flaws, and often provide test scripts or
patches to the source code that addresses the flaws. They are a significant part of the
security handling process, as predicted by the literature on user innovation.
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5.1 Threat-rigidity?
The threat-rigidity hypothesis, described in detail in Chapter 2, predicts that when a
security issue arises in a public forum, the Apache Software Foundation and its members
would respond in a rigid manner. More specifically, the hypothesis suggests the
Foundation would restrict information flow regarding the security issue to only a selected
few individuals, and that those individuals would be among the more senior members of
the organization. Further, the hypothesis predicts that there would be a constriction in
decision-making, meaning that decisions regarding the security issue would be made by
fewer people and that opposing opinions would be censored. The data collected during
this research shows that most of these predictions do not hold in the Apache Software
Foundation's organization.
On its face, the Foundation's process for dealing with reported security issues does
involve less people and therefore restricts the flow of information. Usually, most Apache
decisions are discussed on public mailing lists open to anyone. Accordingly, any other
forum would represent a reduction in the number of people involved in the discussion.
However, while the Apache Security Team represents a small minority of the
Foundation's developers, they usually open the discussion to all the committers on the
project, even those who have not been involved for a while or who have not been
involved in the part of the product that is under discussion. In numerical terms, this
expands the discussion from the six or so members of the Security Team to the more than
fifty product committers (Apache Software Foundation 2005).
Moreover, because the Foundation is composed of volunteers who may work with other
organizations, the Security Team and product teams are unusually diverse. For example,
the Security Team includes employees of a secure web site hosting company, a Linux
provider, a cryptography research laboratory, and a secure data center provider. The
variance of employment and therefore usage scenarios among the product team members
is even greater. This leads to a significantly more heterogeneous team working on
security issue resolution than the equivalent team in most traditional organizations. Even
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if we accept that information flow is restricted within this team, the diversity of use-cases
included in the discussion is large, and the information that does flow represents many
organizations, many usage scenarios, and broad interests. In this environment, there is no
clear dominant opinion, and no executive decision-maker, so the solution that is finally
adopted really suits most, if not all, of the participants.
The lack of management is another way in which the Apache Software Foundation does
not meet the threat-rigidity hypothesis. While the Foundation does have a formal
hierarchy that culminates in a Board of Directors, this hierarchy does not manifest itself
in security issue discussions. A scan of the securityAapache.org archive reveals very
few messages from directors of the Foundation, and an examination of those message
shows that they are specific to the security issue under discussion. They are not an
attempt to force decisions or dictate policy from further up in the organizational
hierarchy.
The Foundation's guidelines for certifying a product as ready for release ensure that all
the product team members have an equal vote. Any individual member can veto a
product release if he or she thinks the security issue is not adequately addressed or for
any other reason (Coar 2005). This individual veto power ensures an honest and
complete discussion of every issue and prevents any one or few individuals from
exercising undue power or making decisions without the group's consent. This includes
situations where the Security Team thinks an issue has been adequately addressed, but an
individual product team member disagrees: discussion and fixing must continue until this
individual is convinced the issue has been properly addressed. Thus, in this regard, the
Foundation's decision-making guidelines ensure that no constriction will take place even
during stressful situations, such as the ones posed by security issues.
Another aspect of threat-rigidity that is frequently noted and discussed in the Literature
Review above is that of the shifting allocation of resources. Frequently, organizations
will scramble to meet competitive threats by re-assigning key employees and shifting
other resources from their standard work towards addressing the imminent threat. This
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happens to a small extent within the Foundation: much of the finding and analysis of
issues is done by external parties, such as security analysts or independent hackers. The
Security Team is composed of volunteers with specific interest in fixing these issues; it
appears that these individuals are enthusiastic to the point that security flaws attract their
interest more than whatever current work they are pursuing. In other words, they do not
need to be re-assigned by a manager: they re-assign themselves to work on these security
issues. Once re-assigned, they do not face the full brunt of dealing with an issue by
themselves: they have the entire Security Team, product team, and issue reporters with
whom to work. Those individuals who are not interested keep working in their own
areas: they are not forced by management to stop their work stream and address the
security issue, because there is no management. Accordingly, the "ripping" effect where
talented engineers are constantly re-assigned to fight fires in the organization does not
occur in the Foundation.
Several key predictions of the threat-rigidity hypothesis do not hold in the context of the
Apache Software Foundation's handling of security issues, a type of competitive threat.
They do not hold because of a combination of a volunteer-based, user-driven
organization that lacks formal management, and a security issue handling process
designed to incorporate the lead users from beginning to end, harnessing their creative
resources to address the problems they themselves report. The evidence shows that the
Foundation makes good use of these volunteers, decides how to handle issues in an open
and participatory manner, resolves issues in a fairly timely fashion, and communicates
the findings to the public adequately.
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5.2 Limitations of this Research
the Apache Software Foundation is a large and mature open-source software
development organization. Its processes have been refined and tested over the past
decade, resulting in a stable and self-sustaining community. While some other open-
source development groups have attained this level of maturity, it is still the exception:
numerous other open-source software development communities are younger, less
mature, and less tested. Accordingly, the findings of this research may only apply to a
certain subset of open-source communities.
The Apache web server product is among the most successful open-source software
products ever developed. With a market share of 70% and over 50,000,000 customers
(Netcraft 2005), it presents a unique research opportunity. On the one hand, the product
is used in tremendously heterogeneous environments with diverse usage scenarios. On
the other hand, its central place in the Internet's infrastructure has led to increased
attention on security, security handling, and related research, both within the Foundation
and outside. While some other open-source products are similarly widely used, the
lessons drawn from this project may be limited to mature, well-developed, extremely-
well-tested projects that attract a community of analysts and security firms.
Security issues are only one type of a competitive threat. One can easily visualize other
threats in the technical realm, such as a competing product introducing a feature that
Apache does not have and trumpeting this feature in press releases, or in the
organizational realm, such as a large portion of Apache's volunteers leaving the
organization for whatever reason. Neither of these competitive threats is considered in
this research: they may cause the same type of behavior in the Foundation, or they may
bring about a different response. This research is not a general study of competitive
threats to open-source organizations.
This research focused on those security issues serious enough to merit widespread
publication, product fixes, and database tracking numbers such as those assigned by the
CVE and CERT organizations described in Chapter 3. There are many other security
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issues reported to the Apache Software Foundation that do not meet these criteria: they
are judged to be insignificant, they merit a change to the documentation rather than a
code fix, or they are deemed so obscure that the reporter is asked to change his or her
environment. These issues are harder to track and analyze, especially given the privacy
of the security(apache.org mailing list archives.
Finally, one must note that there are artificial constraints on the security issue handling
process imposed on the Apache Software Foundation by external organizations, such as
security analysis firms or central coordinating databases. Sometimes these organizations
report an issue but ask the Foundation to hold off on addressing the issue until further
information is discovered or a user's permission to disclose certain data is obtained. In
these cases, the time to issue resolution and the time to product release may be artificially
lengthened, and some of the statistics presented in Chapter 4 may be inaccurate. This
thesis assumes that such occurrences are rare, and that when they do happen the delay is
minimal in comparison with the actual time spent resolving the security issue.
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5.3 Further Work
The conclusions and limitations sections above identify some opportunities for further
work. As noted, the Apache Software Foundation is somewhat unusual within the open-
source world due to its maturity and development processes. Research in other open-
source software development organizations, such as the Mozilla Foundation, the Eclipse
Project, or the GNU Project would be worthwhile: these are also large organizations with
high visibility and high product usage rates. In addition, research into smaller groups,
such as some of the team projects on SourceForge.net, would be insightful. Such
research could analyze these organizations and compare them to Apache.
Another vein of research to build on this work should involve commercial, for-profit
software development organizations. A comparison of how these organizations handle
security issues, and how they respond to competitive threats in general, would be an
interesting and valuable contribution to the field. For example, one might compare
Microsoft's handling of security issues in its Internet Information Server (IIS), a direct
competitor to the Apache web server product, to the Foundation's handling analyzed in
this work. On its face, it appears that the threat-rigidity hypothesis should hold stronger
in a for-profit organization. The security incident data is typically difficult to obtain from
such organizations, but nonetheless it presents a fascinating research opportunity.
There is much work to be done even within the Apache Software Foundation's
organization. As noted above, this thesis focused on security issues serious enough to
merit widespread attention. There are many more issues that do not meet these criteria;
analyzing them, and the organization's handling of them, would present an interesting
research topic. Along similar lines, analyzing the organizational response to other types
of competitive threats, such as a competitor coming up with a much-hyped new feature or
a competitor claiming to be compliant with some new specification not yet implemented
by the Apache web server, would be a good follow-up research project.
Another type of possible research work in this area involves the composition,
consistency, and completeness of the security issue tracking databases themselves. As
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previously noted, they contain fragmented information, and one must labor to join and
cross-reference the data on any given security issue. Perhaps another type of research
database should be created. New ways are needed for cross-referencing this security data
such that the relevant information remains intact and available for many years.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, there is room for further research on what
constitutes a competitive threat. Is there any type of threat that can make an organization
like the Apache Software Foundation drastically alter the way it operates? How do these
volunteer communities fit into the organizational behavior and strategy literature? These
are interesting questions for further work and analysis.
- 83 -
Bibliography
Apache Software Foundation (2005). Apache web server product team:
http://htpd.apache.org/contributors/. Apache Security Team:
http://people.apache.org/-jim/committers.html.
Argyris, C. and D. Schon (1978). Organizational Learning, Addison-Wesley, Reading,
MA.
Audia, P.G. and H.R. Greve (2002). "Performance, Firm Size, and Factory Expansion in
the Shipbuilding Industry." Management Science, accepted for publication in 2005.
Barnett, C.K. and M.G. Pratt (2000). "From threat-rigidity to flexibility: Toward a
learning model of autogenic crisis in organizations." Journal of Organizational Change
Management 13(1): 74-88.
Beckman, C.M., Haunschild, P.R., and D.J. Phillips (2004). "Friends or Strangers? Firm-
Specific Uncertainty, Market Uncertainty, and Network Partner Selection." Organization
Science 15(3): 259-275.
Chavez, R. (2003). "One More Post About ApacheCon 2003." O'Reilly Developer
Weblogs, O'Reilly Media, Inc. http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/wlg/3978.
Christensen, C. (1997). The Innovator's Dilemma. Harvard Business School Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Coar, K. (2005). "Software Development the Apache Way." Linux Magazine, May 2005:
http://www.linux-mag.com/content/view/2015/2304/
Cox, M.J. (2004). "Apache Security Levels." Apache Week, October 2004.
http://www.apacheweek.com/features/security-levels
D'Aveni, R.A. and I.C. MacMillan (1990). "Crisis and the content of managerial
communications: a study of the focus of attention of top managers in surviving and
failing firms." Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 634-657.
D'Aunno, T. and R.I. Sutton (1992). "The Responses of Drug Abuse Treatment
Organizations to Financial Adversity: A Partial Test of the Threat-Rigidity Thesis."
Journal of Management 18(1): 117-131.
Edmondson A.C. (1999). "Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams."
Administrative Science Quarterly 44: 350-383.
- 84 -
Franke, N. and E. von Hippel (2002). "Satisfying Heterogeneous User Needs Via
Innovation Toolkits: The Case of Apache Security Software." MIT Sloan School of
Management Working Paper 4341-02.
Gilbert, C.G. (2002). "Beyond Resource Allocation: Towards a Process Model of
Response to Disruptive Change." Harvard Business School Working Paper 03-018.
Gladstein, D.L. and N.P. Reilly (1985). "Group decision making under threat: The tycoon
game." Academy of Management Journal, 28: 613-627.
Hoffi-Hofstetter, H. and B. Mannheim (1999). "Managers' Coping Resources, Perceived
Organizational Patterns, and Responses during Organizational Recovery from Decline."
Journal of Organizational Behavior 20(5): 665-685.
Jagielski, J. (2005). "Apache Committers" Dynamically-updated web page at
http://people.apache.org/~jim/committers.html.
Janis, I.L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes.
Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, MA.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk." Econometrica 47: 263-292.
Lakhani, K.R. and R.G. Wolf (2005). "Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects." In Perspectives on Free
and Open Source Software, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Lakhani, K.R. (1999). "Sustaining the Virtual Commons: End User Support for Apache
Web Server Software on the Usenet." Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Lakhani, K.R. and E. von Hippel (2003). "How open source software works: "free" user-
to-user assistance." Research Policy 32: 923-943.
Linhart, C., Klein, A., Heled, R., and S. Orrin (2005). "HTTP Request Smuggling"
Watchfire, Inc. whitepaper:
https://www.watchfire.com/securearea/whitepapers.aspx?id=12.
LinuxCare (2000). "Demystifying Open Source: How Open Source Software
Development Works." http://www.linuxcare.com
March, J.G. and Z. Shapira (1987). "Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking."
Management Science 33: 1404-1418.
- 85 -
Mitroff, I.I., Pearson, C., and T.C. Pauchant (1992). "Crisis management and strategic
management: similarities, differences, and challenges." In Advances in Strategic
Management, 8: 235-260. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT.
Netcraft (2005). "October 2005 Web Server Survey" Netcraft.com:
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2005/10/04/october 2005 web server survey.html.
Open Source Initiative (2005). http://www.opensource.org/
Ozcan, S. (2005). "Examining Slack-Innovation Relationship: Longitudinal Evidence
from US Farm Equipment Industry (1966-2001)." Copenhagen Business School Working
Paper.
Pauwels, P. and P. Matthyssens (2002). "The Dynamics of International Market
Withdrawal." In State of the Art of Research in International Marketing, Edwar Elgar
Publishing, Cheltenham, UK.
Price, D. R. and Ximbiot (2005). "Concurrent Versions System."
http://www.nongnu.org/cvs/
Rajeswari, K.S. and R.N. Anantharaman (2003). "Development of an Instrument to
Measure Stress among Software Professionals: Factory Analytic Study." ACM SIGMIS
Conference 2003, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Raymond, E.S. (1999). The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary. O'Reilly and Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA,
USA.
Rosenblatt, Z. and B. Mannheim (1996). "Organizational Response to Decline in the
Israeli Electronics Industry." Organization Studies 19(6): 953-984.
Schein, E.H. (1987). Process Consultation, Vol. II Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Schein, E.H. (1993). "How can organizations learn faster? The challenge of entering the
green room." Sloan Management Review Winter: 85-92.
Sigglekow, N. and D.A. Levinthal (2003). "Temporarily Divide to Conquer: Centralized,
Decentralized, and Reintegrated Organizational Approaches to Exploration and
Adaptation." Organization Science 14(6): 650-669.
Staw, B.M., Sandelands, L.E. and Dutton, J.E. (1981). "Threat-Rigidity Effects in
Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis." Administrative Science Quarterly
26:501-524.
Taylor, M., Kent, M.L. and White, W.J. (2001). "How activity organizations are using
the Internet to build relationships." Public Relations Review 27: 263-284.
86 -
Tigris (2005). "What Is Subversion?" http://subversion.tigris.org/
Thomas, K. (1976). "Conflict and Conflict Management." In M.D. Dunnette (Ed.)
Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology: 889-936. Rand McNally,
Chicago, IL.
Xie, X.F. and X.T. Wang (2003). "Risk Perception and Risky Choice: Situational,
Informational, and Dispositional Effects." Asian Journal of Social Psychology 6: 117-
132.
von Hippel E. (1986). "Lead Users: A Source of Novel Product Concepts." Management
Science 32(7): 791-805.
von Hippel E. (1988). The Sources of Innovation. New York, Oxford University Press.
- 87 -
Appendix A: Original Thesis Proposal
Below is the original proposal for this thesis. It is included here for
historical reference and completeness only.
SDM Thesis
Proposal Form
Student Name: Yoav Shapira MIT I.D. Number: 966257984
Student's E-Mail Address: yoavsh@sloan.mit.edu
Today's Date: 3 March 2005 Thesis Completion Date: January 2006
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Eric von Hippel e-mail Address: evhippel(&,mit.edu
Thesis Reader: Dr. Karim Lakhani e-mail Address: lakhani@mit.edu
Thesis Title: Threat-Fluidity: How Open-Source Communities Defy Classical Threat-
Rigidity Patterns
Motivation:
There is a significant body of literature suggesting that traditional organizations respond
rigidly to threats: there are numerous social and economic factors which make the
organization retrench its stance and focus on its core competencies and established
procedures. Often times, this is not the optimal behavior, and yet even well-managed
organizations succumb to it. The open-source community model, however, is a relatively
new organizational structure that I believe exhibits the opposite behavior: threat-fluidity.
Unlike traditional organizational structures, the open-source community reacts to threats
with an increased level of productivity and efficiency.
The area of open-source user innovation communities holds particular fascination to me
as both a practitioner and a researcher. I am intrigued by its new organizational forms,
and how they can be applied to traditional organizations in order to improve productivity
and quality. I also hope that this thesis will form an important part of Professor von
Hippel and Dr. Lakhani's ongoing research efforts.
Thesis Statement & Primary Research Objectives:
I contend that open-source software development communities differ from traditional
organizations in how they respond to threats: instead of retrenching and slowing down,
these communities exhibit increased efficiency and effectiveness in responding to the
threat.
The primary research objective of this thesis is to prove the above point. The thesis will
include a review of relevant literature on threat-rigidity and open-source community
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models. I will collect and analyze data on how both classical and open-source software
development organization respond to two types of threats: critical flaws being found in
their products, and new technical specifications to which the products must conform.
Finally, I will attempt to point out those features of open-source organizations that can be
transferred into a more traditional environment, if any, the technical means for doing so,
and under what circumstances such reorganizations are beneficial.
Engineering and Management Content:
This thesis will combine engineering and management content by examining both the
social and technical aspects of open-source communities and traditional software
development organizations as they apply to thread-rigidity.
Much of the existing literature has a sociological focus on organizational behavior. But
with the critical and growing importance of software to practically all organizations
today, a work of research in this area which specifically focuses on the practices of
software development should prove valuable to both engineers and managers.
Research Methods & Approaches:
I plan to employ a combination of classical and open-source-specific research methods.
The literature review and statistical analyses will follow well-established scientific
standards. To analyze open-source communities, I will take advantage of the public
history of changes to source code as well as the publicly available mailing list archives
for the products covered in the thesis.
In addition, I hope to take advantage of my network of open-source developers and
conduct a number of interviews or surveys as part of the thesis research. I would like to
correlate their views with those of other innovating lead users found in Professor von
Hippel's work.
Timeline:
1. Thesis initiation, organization, and planning: Spring 2005.
2. Thesis research, initial writing: Summer 2005.
3. Research concluded and first draft complete: October 2005.







Appendix B: Raw Security Issue Record
The following is the raw record of security issues, in XML format, as records by the





- <issue fixed= "2.0.55" released= "20051014">
<cve name="CVE-2005-2970" />
<severity level= "3">moderate< /severity>
<title>Worker MPM memory leak</title>
- <description>
<p>A memory leak in the worker MPM would allow remote attackers to cause
a denial of service (memory consumption) via aborted connections, which
























































20020428 therefore after 2.0.35
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.55" public= "20050707" reported= "20050707"
released="20051014">
<cve name="CVE-2005-2728" />
<severity level= "3" >moderate< /severity>
<title> Byterange filter DoS</title>
- <description>
<p>A flaw in the byterange filter would cause some responses to be buffered
into memory. If a server has a dynamic resource such as a CG I script or PHP
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script which generates a large amount of data, an attacker could send
carefully crafted requests in order to consume resources, potentially leading







































- <issue fixed= "2.0.55" public= "20050830" reported= "20050830"
released= "20051014">
<cve name= "CVE-2005-2700" />
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<title>SSLVerifyClient bypass</title>
- <description>
<p>A flaw in the modssl handling of the "SSLVerifyClient" directive. This flaw
would occur if a virtual host has been configured using "SSLVerifyClient
optional" and further a directive "SSLVerifyClient required" is set for a
specific location. For servers configured in this fashion, an attacker may be
able to access resources that should otherwise be protected, by not

















































<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.55" public= "20050801" released= "20051014">
<cve name="CVE-2005-2491" />
<severity level= "4">low< /severity>
<title>PCRE overflow</title>
<description>
<p>An integer overflow flaw was found in PCRE, a Pern-compatible regular
expression library included within httpd. A local user who has the ability to
create .htaccess files could create a maliciously crafted regular expression


























































public= "20050611" released= "20051014">
<cve name="CVE-2005-2088" />
<severity level= "" >moderate< /severity>
<title>HTTP Request Spoofing</title>
- <description>
<p>A flaw occured when using the Apache server as a HTTP proxy. A remote
attacker could send a HTTP request with both a "Transfer-Encoding:
chunked" header and a Content-Length header, causing Apache to
incorrectly handle and forward the body of the request in a way that causes
the receiving server to process it as a separate HTTP request. This could
allow the bypass of web application firewall protection or lead to cross-site
scripting (XSS) attacks.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.54" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.53" />


































public= "20050608" released= "20051014">
<cve name= "CVE-2005-1268" />
<severity level= "4" >1low< /severity>
<title >Malicious CRL off-by-one< /title>
- <description>
<p>An off-by-one stack overflow was discovered in the modssi CRL
verification callback. In order to exploit this issue the Apache server would





























































<cve name= "CVE-2004-0942" />




<p>An issue was discovered where the field length limit was not enforced for
certain malicious requests. This could allow a remote attacker who is able to
send large amounts of data to a server the ability to cause Apache children
























































<severity level= "3" >moderate< /severity>
<description>
<p>A buffer overflow in modinclude could allow a local user who is








































































































public= "20040320" reported= "20040302"
released= "20050208">
<cve name= "CVE-2004-1834" />
<severity level= "4" >1low< /severity>
<title>moddiskcache stores sensitive headers</title>
- <description>
<p>The experimental moddiskcache module stored client authentication
credentials for cached objects such as proxy authentication credentials and
Basic Authentication passwords on disk.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.52" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.51" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.50" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.49" />
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- <issue fixed= "2.0.53" public="20041001" reported= "20041001"
released= "20050208">
<cve name= "CVE-2004-0885" />
<severity level= "3" >moderate< /severity>
<title> SSLCipherSuite bypass</title>
- <description>
<p>An issue has been discovered in the modssi module when configured to
use the "SSLCipherSuite" directive in directory or location context. If a
particular location context has been configured to require a specific set of
cipher suites, then a client will be able to access that location using any













































<p>A flaw in Apache 2.0.51 (only) broke the merging of the Satisfy directive
which could result in access being granted to resources despite any
configured authentication< /p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.51" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.51" public= "20040915" released= "20040915"
reported= "20040825">
<cve name="CVE-2004-0786" />
<title> IPv6 URI parsing heap overflow</title>
<severity level= "I">critical </severity>
- <description>
<p>Testing using the Codenomicon HTTP Test Tool performed by the Apache
Software Foundation security group and Red Hat uncovered an input
validation issue in the IPv6 URI parsing routines in the apr-util library. If a
remote attacker sent a request including a carefully crafted URI, an httpd
child process could be made to crash. One some BSD systems it is believed



















































<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.35" />
</issue>
<issue fixed="2.0.51" public= "20040915" released= "20040915"
reported= "20040805">
<cve name= "CVE-2004-0747" />
<severity level= "4">low</severity>
<title> Environment variable expansion flaw</title>
- <description>
<p>The Swedish IT Incident Centre (SITIC) reported a buffer overflow in the
expansion of environment variables during configuration file parsing. This
issue could allow a local user to gain the privileges of a httpd child if a
















































<cve name= "CVE-2004-0751" />
public= "20040707"
<severity level= "4" >low</severity>
<title>Malicious SSL proxy can cause crash</title>
-description>
<p>An issue was discovered in the modssi module in Apache 2.0.44-2.0.50
which could be triggered if the server is configured to allow proxying to a
remote SSL server. A malicious remote SSL server could force an httpd child
process to crash by sending a carefully crafted response header. This issue
is not believed to allow execution of arbitrary code and will only result in a
denial of service where a threaded process model is in use.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.50" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.49" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.48" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.47" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.46" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.45" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.44" />
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</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.51" released= "20040915" public= "20040707"
reported= "20040707">
<cve name="CVE-2004-0748" />
<severity level= "2" >important</severity>
<title>SSL connection infinite loop</title>
<description>
<p>An issue was discovered in the modssi module in Apache 2.0. A remote
attacker who forces an SSL connection to be aborted in a particular state
may cause an Apache child process to enter an infinite loop, consuming CPU
resources. < /p>
</description>















































<p>An issue was discovered in the moddav module which could be triggered
for a location where WebDAV authoring access has been configured. A
malicious remote client which is authorized to use the LOCK method could
force an httpd child process to crash by sending a particular sequence of
LOCK requests. This issue does not allow execution of arbitrary code. and












































<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="2.0.50" released="20040701" reported="20040613"
public="20040701">
<cve name="CVE-2004-0493" />
<title>Header parsing memory leak</title>
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
- <description>
<p>A memory leak in parsing of HTTP headers which can be triggered
remotely may allow a denial of service attack due to excessive memory
consumption. </p>
</description>


















































- <issue fixed="2.0.50" released="20040701" public="20040517">
<cve name= "CVE-2004-0488" />
<severity level= "4"> low</severity>
<title>FakeBasicAuth overflow</title>
- <description>
<p>A buffer overflow in the mod_ssi FakeBasicAuth code could be exploited by
an attacker using a (trusted) client certificate with a subject DN field which











































<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "1.3.32" public= "20030610" released= "20041020"
reported= "20030608">
<cve name="CVE-2004-0492" />
<severity level= "3" >moderate< /severity>
<title>modproxy buffer overflow</title>
- <description>
<p>A buffer overflow was found in the Apache proxy module, mod-proxy,
which can be triggered by receiving an invalid Content-Length header. In
order to exploit this issue an attacker would need to get an Apache
installation that was configured as a proxy to connect to a malicious site.
This would cause the Apache child processing the request to crash, although
this does not represent a significant Denial of Service attack as requests will
continue to be handled by other Apache child processes. This issue may lead
to remote arbitrary code execution on some BSD platforms.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.31" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.29" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.28" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.27" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.26" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "1.3.31" public= "20030224" released= "20040512"
reported= "20030224">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0020" />
<title>Error log escape filtering< /title>
<severity level= "4">low< /severity>
- <description>
<p>Apache does not filter terminal escape sequences from error logs, which
could make it easier for attackers to insert those sequences into terminal
emulators containing vulnerabilities related to escape sequences.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.29" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.28" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.27" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.26" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.24" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.22" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.20" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.19" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.17" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.14" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.12" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.11" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.9" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.6" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.4" />
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<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.3" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.2" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "1.3.31" public= "20031218" released= "20040512"
reported= "20031218">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0987" />
<severity level= "4" >1low< /severity>
<title>moddigest nonce checking< /title>
- <description>
<p>mod-digest does not properly verify the nonce of a client response by
using a AuthNonce secret. This could allow a malicious user who is able to
sniff network traffic to conduct a replay attack against a website using
Digest protection. Note that moddigest implements an older version of the
MD5 Digest Authentication specification which is known not to work with










































public= "20040318" released= "20040512"
reported= "20040225">
<cve name="CVE-2004-0174" />
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<title>listening socket starvation</title>
-<description>
<p>A starvation issue on listening sockets occurs when a short-lived
connection on a rarely-accessed listening socket will cause a child to hold
the accept mutex and block out new connections until another connection
arrives on that rarely-accessed listening socket. This issue is known to




























































<issue fixed= "2.0.49" public= "20040318" released= "20040319"
reported="20040225">
<cve name="CVE-2004-0174" />
<severity level= "2"> important< /severity>
<title> listening socket starvation< /title>
- <description>
<p>A starvation issue on listening sockets occurs when a short-lived
connection on a rarely-accessed listening socket will cause a child to hold
the accept mutex and block out new connections until another connection
arrives on that rarely-accessed listening socket. This issue is known to













































<title>Allow/Deny parsing on big-endian 64-bit platforms</title>
<severity level="2"> important</severity>
- <description>
<p>A bug in the parsing of Allow/Deny rules using IP addresses without a













































<cve name= "CVE-2004-0113" />
<severity level= "2">important< /severity>
<title>modssi memory leak</title>
- <description>
<p>A memory leak in modssi allows a remote denial of service attack against








































- <issue fixed= "2.0.49" public= "20030224" released= "20040319"
reported= "20030224">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0020" />
<severity level= "4"> ow</severity>
<title>Error log escape filtering< /title>
- <description>
<p>Apache does not filter terminal escape sequences from error logs, which
could make it easier for attackers to insert those sequences into terminal






















































public= "20031027" released= "20031027"
reported="20030804">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0542" />
<severity level= "4" >ow< /severity>





<title>CGI output information leak</title>
<severity level= "3" >moderate</severity>
- <description>
<p>A bug in modcgid mishandling of CGI redirect paths can result in CGI
output going to the wrong client when a threaded MPM is used.</p>
<p>By using a regular expression with more than 9 captures a buffer overflow
can occur in modalias or modrewrite. To exploit this an attacker would









































- <issue fixed= "2.0.48" public="20031027"
reported="20030804">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0542" />
<severity level= "4" >low</severity>
released= "20031027"
<title>Local configuration regular expression overflow< /title>
- <description>
<p> By using a regular expression with more than 9 captures a buffer overflow
can occur in modalias or modrewrite. To exploit this an attacker would










































<severity level= "2"> important< /severity>
<title >RotateLogs DoS</title>
- <description>
<p>The rotatelogs support program on Win32 and OS/2 would quit logging
and exit if it received special control characters such as OxlA.</p>
</description>


















































- <issue fixed= "2.0.47" public= "20030709" released= "20030709"
reported= "20030625">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0254" />
<severity level="3" >moderate< /severity>
<title>Remote DoS via IPv6 ftp proxy</title>
- <description>
<p>When a client requests that proxy ftp connect to a ftp server with IPv6
address, and the proxy is unable to create an I Pv6 socket, an infinite loop























- <issue fixed= "2.0.47" public= "20030709"
reported= "20030625">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0253" />
<severity level= "2"> important< /severity>
released= "20030709"
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<title>Remote DoS with multiple Listen directives</title>
- <description>
<p>ln a server with multiple listening sockets a certain error returned by
accepto on a rarely access port can cause a temporary denial of service,
due to a bug in the prefork MPM.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.46" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.45" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.44" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.43" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>






<p>A bug in the optional renegotiation code in modssl included with Apache
httpd can cause cipher suite restrictions to be ignored. This is triggered if
optional renegotiation is used (SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate) along with
verification of client certificates and a change to the cipher suite over the
renegotiation. </p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.46" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.45" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.44" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.43" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.42" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.46" public= "20030528" released= "20030528"
reported= "20030409">
<cve name= "CVE-2003-0245" />
<severity level= "1 ">critical </severity>
<title>APR remote crash</title>
- <description>
<p>A vulnerability in the apr-psprintf function in the Apache Portable Runtime
(APR) library allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash)
and possibly execute arbitrary code via long strings, as demonstrated using

























<issue fixed="2.0.46" public="20030528" released="20030528"
reported="20030425">
<cve name= "CVE-2003-0189" />
<severity level= "2"> important</severity>
<title>Basic Authentication DoS</title>
- <description>
<p>A build system problem in Apache 2.0.40 through 2.0.45 allows remote
attackers to cause a denial of access to authenticated content when a
threaded server is used.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.45" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.44" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.43" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.40" />
</issue>
<issue fixed="2.0.46" public="20040402" released="20040402">
<cve name= "CVE-2003-0134" />
<severity level=" 2" >important< /severity>
<title>OS2 device name DoS</title>
<description>
<p>Apache on OS2 up to and including Apache 2.0.45 have a Denial of Service
vulnerability caused by device names.</p>
</description>


























- <issue fixed= "2.0.46" released="20040402" public="20030224"
reported= "20030224">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0083" />
<severity level= "4" >Ilow< /severity>











<p>Apache did not filter terminal escape sequences from its access logs,
which could make it easier for attackers to insert those sequences into
terminal emulators containing vulnerabilities related to escape
sequences. </p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.45" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.44" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.43" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.45" public= "20040402" released= "20040402">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0132" />
<severity level= "2" >important</severity>
<title>Line feed memory leak DoS</title>
- <description>
<p>Apache 2.0 versions before Apache 2.0.45 had a significant Denial of
Service vulnerability. Remote attackers could cause a denial of service
(memory consumption) via large chunks of linefeed characters, which
causes Apache to allocate 80 bytes for each linefeed.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.44" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.43" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.42" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="2.0.44" public="20030120" released="20030120"
reported = "20021204">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0016" />
<severity level="1 ">critical< /severity>
<flaw type="msdos-device" />
<title>MS-DOS device name filtering </title>
- <description>
<p>On Windows platforms Apache did not correctly filter MS-DOS device
names which could lead to denial of service attacks or remote code
execution. </p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.43" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.40" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
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<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="2.0.44" public="20030120" released="20030120"
reported="20021115">
<cve name= "CVE-2003-0017" />
<flaw type="unk" />
<severity level= "2"> important< /severity>
<title>Apache can serve unexpected files</title>
<description>
<p>On Windows platforms Apache could be forced to serve unexpected files
by appending illegal characters such as '<'to the request URL</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.43" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.40" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
<issue fixed="1.3.27" public="20021003" released="20021003"
reported="20020923">
<cve name= "CVE-2002-0843" />
<severity level=" 2" >important< /severity>
<flaw type="buf" />
<title>Buffer overflows in ab utility</title>
<description>
<p>Buffer overflows in the benchmarking utility ab could be exploited if ab is
run against a malicious server</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.26" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.24" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.22" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.20" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.19" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.17" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.14" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.12" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="11.3.11" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.9" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.6" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.4" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.3" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.2" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.0" />
</issue>
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- <issue fixed= "1.3.27" public="20021003" released= "20021003"
reported="20011111">
<cve name="CVE-2002-0839" />
<severity level= "2" >important</severity>
<flaw type="perm" />
<title>Shared memory permissions lead to local privilege escalation</title>
- <description>
<p>The permissions of the shared memory used for the scoreboard allows an
attacker who can execute under the Apache U ID to send a signal to any
process as root or cause a local denial of service attack.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.26" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.24" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.22" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.20" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.19" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.17" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.14" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.12" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.11" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.9" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.6" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.4" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.3" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.2" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.0" />
</issue>




<severity level= "4" >low</severity>
<title>Error page XSS using wildcard DNS</title>
- <description>
<p>Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the default error page of Apache
2.0 before 2.0.43, and 1.3.x up to 1.3.26, when UseCanonicalName is "Off"
and support for wildcard DNS is present, allows remote attackers to execute
script as other web page visitors via the Host: header.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.35" />
</issue>




<severity level= "" >moderate</severity>
<title>CGI scripts source revealed using WebDAV</title>
- <description>
<p> In Apache 2.0.42 only, for a location where both WebDAV and CGI were
enabled, a POST request to a CGI script would reveal the CGI source to a
remote user.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.42" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.42" public= "20020919" released= "20020924">
<cve name="CVE-2002-1593" />
<severity level=" 3" >moderate< /severity>
<title>moddav crash</title>
- <description>
<p>A flaw was found in handling of versioning hooks in moddav. An attacker
could send a carefully crafted request in such a way to cause the child
process handling the connection to crash. This issue will only result in a
denial of service where a threaded process model is in use.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.40" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>




<title>Error page XSS using wildcard DNS</title>
<flaw type="css" />
- <description>
<p>Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the default error page of Apache
2.0 before 2.0.43, and 1.3.x up to 1.3.26, when UseCanonicalName is "Off"
and support for wildcard DNS is present, allows remote attackers to execute
script as other web page visitors via the Host: header.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.26" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.24" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.22" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.20" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.19" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.17" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.14" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.12" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.11" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.9" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.6" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.4" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.3" />
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<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.2" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.40" public= "20020809" released= "20020809"
reported= "20020807">
<title>Path vulnerability</title>
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<flaw type="priv" />
- <description>
<p>Certain URIs would bypass security and allow users to invoke or access
any file depending on the system configuration. Affects Windows, OS2,







<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.39" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="2.0.37" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.40" public= "20020809" released= "20020809"
reported= "20020705">
<title>Path revealing exposures< /title>
<severity level= "4" >low</severity>
<flaw type="unk" />
- <description>
<p>A path-revealing exposure was present in multiview type map negotiation
(such as the default error documents) where a module would report the full
path of the typemapped .var file when multiple documents or no documents
could be served. Additionally a path-revealing exposure in cgi/cgid when
Apache fails to invoke a script. The modules would report "couldn't create




<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.39" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.37" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="2.0.36" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.37" public= "20020617" released= "20020618"
reported="20020527">





<p>Malicious requests can cause various effects ranging from a relatively
harmless increase in system resources through to denial of service attacks
and in some cases the ability to execute arbitrary remote code.</p>
</description>
<cve name="CVE-2002-0392" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.36" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "2.0.36" public= "20020422" released= "20020508">
<cve name="CVE-2002-1592" />
<severity issue= "4">low< /severity>
<title>Warning messages could be displayed to users</title>
- <description>
<p>l n some cases warning messages could get returned to end users in
addition to being recorded in the error log. This could reveal the path to a
CGI script for example, a minor security exposure.</p>
</description>
<affects prod="httpd" version= "2.0.35" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "1.3.26" public= "20020617" released= "20020618"
reported= "20020527">
<title>Apache Chunked encoding vulnerability< /title>
<severity level = "1 ">critical </severity>
<flaw type="buf" />
- <description>
<p>Requests to all versions of Apache 1.3 can cause various effects ranging
from a relatively harmless increase in system resources through to denial of


































- <issue fixed="1.3.26" released="20020618"
public="20030224">
<cve name="CVE-2003-0083" />
<severity level= "4" >low< /severity>
reported= "20030224"
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<title>Filtered escape sequences< /title>
- <description>
<p>Apache does not filter terminal escape sequences from its access logs,
which could make it easier for attackers to insert those sequences into



































released= "20020322" reported= "20020213">
<severity level="1 ">critical< /severity>





<p>Apache for Win32 before 1.3.24 and 2.0.34-beta allows remote attackers
to execute arbitrary commands via parameters passed to batch file CGI
scripts.</p>
</description>










































- <issue fixed= "1.3.22" released= "20011012" public= "20010928"
reported="20010918">
<title>Requests can cause directory listing to be displayed</title>
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<flaw type="unk" />
- <description>
<p>A vulnerability was found in the Win32 port of Apache 1.3.20. A client
submitting a very long URI could cause a directory listing to be returned




<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.20" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "1.3.22" released= "20011012" public= "20010928">
<severity level= "3" >moderate< /severity>
<title>split-logfile can cause arbitrary log files to be written to</title>
- <description>
- <p>
A vulnerability was found in the
<samp>split-logfile</samp>
support program. A request with a specially crafted
<samp>Host:</samp>
header could allow any file with a
<samp>.log</samp>


































- <issue fixed= "1.3.22" released= "20011012" public= "20010709">
- BUGTRAQ:20010709 How Google indexed a file with no external link
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UR:L: htt.p: //www. securi.t.yfocus com/archiv/1/200107C'92.14744 .A28765@bra.ssc
annon . net
* CONFIR1M: http: / /www. apa cheweek .1com/issues /01-10-05#security
* BID:3co!,/* d 00
URl:http: //www. securityfocus com/bid/3009
<severity level= 2">important< /severity>
<title>Multiviews can cause a directory listing to be displayed</title>
- <description>
A vulnerability was found when
<directive> Multiviews< /directive>
are used to negotiate the directory index. In some configurations,









<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.20" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.19" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.17" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.14" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.12" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.11" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.9" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.6" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.4" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.3" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.2" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed= "1.3.20" released= "20010522">
<title>Denial of service attack on Win32 and OS2</title>
<cve name="CVE-2001-1342" />
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<flaw type="dos-malform" />
- <description>
<p>A vulnerability was found in the Win32 and OS2 ports of Apache 1.3. A
client submitting a carefully constructed URI could cause a General
Protection Fault in a child process, bringing up a message box which would
have to be cleared by the operator to resume operation. This vulnerability
introduced no identified means to compromise the server other than
introducing a possible denial of service.</p>
</description>
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h1tp: //www. securiteam. co/wi.ndowsntfocus/5IPOQK4.4AU. html
<os>win32</os>
<os>os2</os>






































- <issue fixed= "1.3.19" released= "20010228">
<--
.aocore 200:O2
<title>Requests can cause directory listing
<severity level= "2">important< /severity>
<description>
<p>







to display a directory listing instead of the multiview index.html file if a very




<p>From Apache 1.3.19 a 403 (Forbidden) response is given.</p>
</resolution>
- <exploit>
<p> In order to exploit this bug the server has to have "Options +MultiViews"
enabled and be using multiviews to determine which document to send as a
directory index. By contstructing a GET request with the right number of
trailing slashes the directory index will be displayed instead of the default
document index. The number of trailing slashes required depends on the
directory requested, where the full path is around the OS file limit, usually
1024 characters. With too few trailing slashes the index.html file will be





<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.17" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.14" />
<affects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.12" />




* NetWa re is a. case i nsensitive file system so all direcry and file
names are now compared in a case insensitive manner to avoid security
holes.
- <issue fixed= "1.3.14" released= "20001013" public= "20000929">
- <1--
RHSA-2000: 088-04
<cve name= "CVE-2000-0913" public= "20000929" />
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>





, can allow access to any file on the web server. The vulnerability occurs
only with certain specific cases of using regular expression references in
<samp>RewriteRule</samp>
directives: If the destination of a
<samp>RewriteRule</samp>
contains regular expression references then an attacker will be able to
access any file on the server.
</p>
</description>
<exploit> RewriteRule /test/(.*) /usr/ocal/data/test-stuff/\$1 RewriteRule
/more-icons/(.*) /icons/\$1 </exploit>
<os>all</os>
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.12" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.11" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.9" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.6" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.4" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version ="1.3.3" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version=" 1.3.2" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.0" />
</issue>
i don't think this one actually exists, I looked
tVhrouqh the sweb and think. it. 's a dup:li cate
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- <issue fixed="1.3.14" released="20001013">
<severity level="2" >important</severity>
<title>Mass virtual hosting can display CGI source</title>
- <description>
- p>
A security problem for users of the mass virtual hosting module,
<samp>modvhost_alias</samp>
, causes the source to a CG I to be sent if the
<samp>cgi-bin</samp>
directory is under the document root. However, it is not normal to have your




<cve name= "CVE-2000-1204" />
<flaw type="unk" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.12" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.11" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.9" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="1.3.14" released="20001013">
<cve name= "CVE-2000-0505" />
<severity level=" 3" >moderate< /severity>
<title>Requests can cause directory listing to be displayed on NT</title>
- <description>
<p>A security hole on Apache for Windows allows a user to view the listing of































- <issue fixed="1.3.12" released= "20000225">
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<title>Cross-site scripting can reveal private session information</title>
- <description>
<p>Apache was vulnerable to cross site scripting issues. It was shown that
malicious HTML tags can be embedded in client web requests if the server or
script handling the request does not carefully encode all information
displayed to the user. Using these vulnerabilities attackers could, for
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<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.11" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.9" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.6" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.4" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.3" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.2" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="1.3.11" released="20000121">
<severity level=" 3" >moderate< /severity>
<title>Mass virtual hosting security issue</title>
- <description>
- <p>
A security problem can occur for sites using mass name-based virtual
hosting (using the new
<samp>modvhostalias</samp>
module) or with special
<samp>modrewrite</samp>
rules.






<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.9" />
- <_--
mod rewr.:Lte stuff o..1.y below
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.6" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.4" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.3" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.2" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<maybeaffects prod="httpd" version="1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="1.3.4" released="19990111">
<severity level= "2" >important</severity>
<title>Denial of service attack on Win32</title>
-<description>
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<p>There have been a number of important security fixes to Apache on
Windows. The most important is that there is much better protection




<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.3" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.2" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="1.3.2" released= "19980923">
<cve name="CVE-1999-1199" />
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
<flaw type="memleak" />
<title>Multiple header Denial of Service vulnerability</title>
- <description>
<p>A serious problem exists when a client sends a large number of headers
with the same header name. Apache uses up memory faster than the
amount of memory required to simply store the received data itself. That is,
memory use increases faster and faster as more headers are received,
rather than increasing at a constant rate. This makes a denial of service
attack based on this method more effective than methods which cause




<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />
<affects prod="httpd" version= "1.3.0" />
</issue>
- <issue fixed="1.3.2" released= "19980923">
<title>Denial of service attacks</title>
<severity level= "2" >important< /severity>
- <description>
- <p>
Apache 1.3.2 has better protection against denial of service attacks. These
are when people make excessive requests to the server to try and prevent
other people using it. In 1.3.2 there are several new directives which can






<affects prod="httpd" version="1.3.1" />




* Avoid denial of service attacks if a coif iuration file (such as a
* .htaccess file) is a. device file, by refuing to open device files
apart from /dev/null which is still valid (1.3.0)
Correctly handle over-1.ong lines in configuration.Les (1.3.0)
* Fix denial of service attack by sending requests with lots of
slashes in them (1.3.0)
* Deny access to directories .if a htaccess file in that directory
cannot be read (1.3.0)
</security>
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Appendix C: Security Record Processing Scripts
The following software was written to process the raw security records above. It is a
collection of Java classes aimed to enable the reader to reproduce these results as well as






















































} else if(getSeverity().equals("critical")) {
return true;





private Date findEarliest() {
if((reported != null) && (pub == null)) {
return reported;
} else if((reported == null) && (pub null)) {
return pub;
} else if((reported == null) && (pub null)) {
return released;






* Returns the number of days it took to resolve this issue.
*
* @return The number of days
*/
double getDaysToResolve() {
Date start = findEarliest(;
Date finish = released;
return findDifferenceInDays(start, finish);
}
* Finds the difference between two dates, in days.
*
* @param datel The first date (can't be null)
* @param date2 The second date (can't be null)
* @return The difference between datel and date2, in days
*/
static double findDifferenceInDays(final Date datel, final
date2) {
if((datel == null) 11 (date2 == null)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Args cannot be
Date
null.");
long millis = Math.abs(date2.getTime() - datel.getTimeo);
double seconds = millis / 1000;
double minutes = seconds / 60;
double hours = minutes / 60;




public String toString() {
StringBuffer buffer = new StringBuffero;
buffer.append("Issue: ");
buffer.append("CVE: " + cve);
buffer.append(" / ");
buffer.append("Release fixed: " + releaseFixed);
buffer.append(" / ");
buffer.append("released: " + released);
buffer.append(" / ");
buffer.append("reported: " + reported);
buffer.append(" / ");
buffer.append("public: " + pub);
buffer.append(" / ");







* Entry point to the issue analyzer package.
*/
public final class IssueAnalyzer {
* The parser.
*/




* Parses the issues file.
*
* @param path (Optional) The path to vulnerabilities-httpd.xml
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
private void parse(final String path) throws Exception {
parser = new IssueParsero;







System.out.println("Done parsing, got +
parser.getIssues().size() + " issues.");
* Command-line entry point. One argument is optional: the path to
* the vulnerabilities-httpd file.
*
* @param args Command-line arguments
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
IssueAnalyzer ia = new IssueAnalyzero;









* Returns the security-driven releases.
*
* @return The security-driven releases
*/
private List getSecurityDrivenReleases() {
List combined = parser.getReleases(;
List driven = new ArrayList();
Iterator iter = combined.iterator);
Release rel = null;
while(iter.hasNext()) {




System.out.println("Security-driven releases: " + driven);
return driven;
* Calculates the average release times, for security-driven and
all releases.
*
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
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private void calculateAverageReleaseTimes() throws Exception {
List releases = parser.getReleasesl3();
double avg = calculateAverageReleaseTime(releases);




System.out.println("Average release time for 2.0 releases: " +
avg);
List driven = getSecurityDrivenReleases(;
avg = calculateAverageReleaseTime(releases);
System.out.println("Average release time for security-driven
releases: " + avg);
* Calculates the average release time for releases on the given
list.
*
* @param releases The releases
* @return The average (in days)
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
private double calculateAverageReleaseTime(final List releases)
throws Exception {
if((releases == null) 11 (releases.size() < 1)) {
return 0.0;
I
Iterator iter = releases.iterator(;
Release release = null;
String version null;
String nextVersion = null;
Date date = null;
Date nextDate = null;
double releaseTime = 0.0;
List releaseTimes = new ArrayListo;
ReleaseDates releaseDates = ReleaseDates.getInstance(null);
while(iter.hasNext()) {


















double sum = 0.0;
while(iter.hasNext()) {
sum += ((Double) iter.next().doubleValue();
return sum / releaseTimes.size);
* Calculates the average number of issues per release, for 1.3,
2.0, and combined.
*
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
private void calculateAverageIssuesPerRelease() throws Exception {
List r13 = parser.getReleasesl3();
double avgl3 = calculateAverageIssuesPerRelease(r13);
System.out.println("1.3 average issues per release: " + avgl3);
List r20 = parser.getReleases20();
double avg20 = calculateAverageIssuesPerRelease(r20);
System.out.println("2.0 average issues per release: " + avg20);
List combined = parser.getReleases(;
double avgCombined =
calculateAverageIssuesPerRelease(combined);
System.out.println("Combined average issues per release: " +
avgCombined);
* Calculates the average number of issues per release in the given
list.
*
* @param releases The releases
* @return The average
*/
private double calculateAverageIssuesPerRelease(final List
releases) {
if((releases == null) 11 (releases.size() < 1)) {
return 0.0;
}
Iterator iter = releases.iterator(;
Release rel = null;
double sum = 0.0;
int n = 0;
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while(iter.hasNext()) {




return sum / n;
/ **
* Counts the issues that have CVE names.
*/
private void countCveNames() {
List issues = parser.getIssues(;




Iterator iter = issues.iterator();
Issue issue = null;
String name = null;
int names = 0;












System.out.println(names + " issues have
n) + "%) ");
/ **
* Calculates the average resolution time by
* for all levels of severity.
*
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
CVE names (" + (100 *
issue severity
private void calculateAverageResolutionTime() throws Exception {
List issues = parser.getIssues(;
















* Calculates the average resolution time for the issues in the
given
* list that match the given severity level.
* @param issues The list of issues
* @param severity The severity level to match
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
private void calculateAverageResolutionTime(final List issues,
final String severity) throws Exception {
if((issues == null) 11 (issues.size() < 1)) {
return;
}
Iterator iter = issues.iterator();
Issue issue = null;
int n = 0;
double sum = 0;
while(iter.hasNext()) {
issue = (Issue) iter.next();








double average = sum / n;
System.out.println("Average resolution time: " + average + "
using severity filter: " + severity +















final class IssueParser extends DefaultHandler {





* The release currently being parsed.
private Release release;
* All the issues.
private static List issues;
* The 1.3 releases.
private static List releasesl3;
* The 2.0 releases.
*/
private static List releases20;
* All the releases.
private static List releases;
* The date format: yyyyMMdd.
private SimpleDateFormat sdf = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMdd");









issues = new ArrayList();
releases13 = new ArrayList();
releases20 = new ArrayList();
releases = new ArrayList();
sdf = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMdd");
releaseDates = ReleaseDates.getInstance(null);
* Parses the file.
*
* @param path (Optional) path to vulnerabilities-httpd.xml
* @throws Exception If any error occurs
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void parse(final String path) throws Exception
DefaultHandler handler = new IssueParser(;
SAXParserFactory factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
SAXParser saxParser = factory.newSAXParser();






* Returns a list of all the issues.
*





* Returns a list of all the releases.
*
* @reutrn All the releases
List getReleases()
return releases;
* Returns all the 1.3 releases.
* May return an empty list.




* Returns all the 2.0 releases.
* May return an empty list.
* @return The 2.0 releases
List getReleases20() {
return releases20;
* Adds the current release to the proper list.
*/
private void addRelease() {
if(release == null) {
- 133 -




String version = release.getVersiono;
if((version == null) 1| (version.trimo.length() < 1)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Can't add release
without a version.");





throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unknown branch: " +
version);
}
* Returns the XML element name. This is a convenience method
* added to handle both namespace-aware and namespace-unaware
* SAX parser implementations. Preference is given to the local
* name over the qualified one.
*
* @param sName The local name
* @param qName The qualified name
* @return The name
*/
private String getName(final String sName, final String qName)
String name = sName;





* Parses the given string into a Date object.
*
* @param yyyymmdd The date string
* @return The Date object, or null if an error occurred
*/
private Date getDate(final String yyyymmdd) {
try {
return sdf.parse(yyyymmdd);




* Translates the integer severity level (from 1-4)
* into the string one, from critical to low.
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** @param level 1-4
* @return The string level
*/
private String getSeverityLevel(final String level) {
if((level == null) 1| (level.trimo.length() < 1)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Arg can't be null or
empty.");
} else if(level.equals("1")) {
return "critical";
} else if(level.equals("2")) {
return "important";
} else if(level.equals("3")) {
return "moderate";
} else if(level.equals("4")) {
return "low";
else {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unknown severity level:
+ level);
* Called by the SAX parser implementation for each element.
*/
public void startElement(String namespaceURI, String sName, String
qName, Attributes attrs)
throws SAXException
String name = getName(sName, qName);
if(name.equals("issue"))
issue = new Issueo;
for(int i = 0; i < attrs.getLengtho; i++) {




} else if(aName.equals("released")) {
issue.setReleased(getDate(attrs.getValue(i)));
} else if(aName.equals("public")) {
issue.setPub(getDate(attrs.getValue(i)));
} else if(aName.equals("fixed")) {
String version = attrs.getValue(i);
issue.setReleaseFixed(version);
if(release == null) {
release = new Release();
release.setVersion(version);




release = new Release(;
release.setVersion(version);
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if(release.getDate() == null) {
System.out.println("Setting date for " +
release.getVersion() +




for(int i = 0; i < attrs.getLength(; i++) {





for(int i = 0; i < attrs.getLength(); i++) {





* Called by the SAXParser implementation at the end of each
element.
public void endElement(String namespaceURI, String sName, String
qName) throws SAXException {















issues = new ArrayListo;
seriousIssues = 0;
}


























return getIssueCount(true) > 0;
}
public String toString() {
StringBuffer buffer = new StringBuffer();
buffer.append("Release " + version + " has " +
getIssueCount(false) + " issues, " +













* Holds information about release dates.
*
* ** Note that this class relies on the ordering of the source file:
* ** It assumes all the 2.0 releases are first, in descending order,
* *** followed by all the 1.3 releases, also in descending order.
*/
final class ReleaseDates {
* The instance of this singleton.
*/
private static ReleaseDates instance = null;
* The release dates for the 2.0 branch, keyed by version.
*/
private Map release20Dates;
* The release dates for the 1.3 branch, keyed by version.
*/
private Map releasel3Dates;
* Map of release name to next release name.
* The value for 2.0.55 is null, for 2.0.54 is 2.0.55, etc.
*/
private Map nextReleases;





* @param path (Optional) path to releaseDates.txt file
*/
private ReleaseDates(final String path) throws Exception {
release20Dates = new HashMap();
releasel3Dates = new HashMapo;
nextReleases = new HashMapo;
sdf = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMdd");






* Returns the instance of this singleton.
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** @param path (Optional) path to releaseDates.txt file
* @return ReleaseDates
* @throws Exception If an error occurs
*/
static ReleaseDates getInstance(final String path) throws Exception




* Reads the file, populates the release dates map.
* @param path The file path
*/
private void readFile(final String path) throws Exception {
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(new
File(path)));
String line = null;
String nextVersion = null;
String version = null;
String yyyymmdd = null;
Date date = null;
StringTokenizer st = null;
while((line = reader.readLine()) != null) {













* Returns the next version name for the given version name.
* May return null.
*
* @param version The version, e.g. 2.0.54
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* @return The next version name, e.g. 2.0.55, or null
*/
String getNextVersion(final String version) {
return (String) nextReleases.get(version);
}
* Returns the release date for the given release.
*
* @param version The version
* @return The date (if found, null otherwise)
*/
Date getDate(final String version) {
if((version == null) 11 (version.trimo.length() < 1)) {
return null;
I else if(version.startsWith("1.3")) {
return (Date) releasel3Dates.get(version);
I else {
return (Date) release20Dates.get(version);
}
}
}
-140-
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